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CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE
Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash∗
Abstract
A foundational concept of American jurisprudence is the principle
that it is unfair to allow litigants to be haled into far away tribunals
when the litigants and the litigation have little or nothing to do with the
location of such courts. Historically, both personal jurisdiction and
venue each served this purpose in related, but distinct ways. Personal
jurisdiction is, at base, a limit on the authority of the sovereign. Venue,
in contrast, aims to protect parties from being forced to litigate in a
location where they would be unfairly disadvantaged. The constitutional
boundaries of these early principles came to be tested in the first half of
the twentieth century, as the rise of interstate commerce, transportation,
and communication technologies prompted states to reach beyond their
borders by expanding the jurisdictional limits of their courts through
now familiar long-arm statutes. In International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, the Court situated the due process inquiry related to a fair
location for trial in the personal jurisdiction doctrine—and thus
relegated venue to its current subconstitutional status. Forcing the
square peg of venue interests into the round hole of personal jurisdiction
was, on a theoretical level, an odd choice from the outset. This
theoretical foible has plagued the Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence ever since. As a result, the Court’s personal jurisdiction
cases are marked by fractured decisions with dueling opinions that
articulate conflicting visions of the nature of the due process inquiry in
personal jurisdiction analysis. Some Justices minimize the fairness
inquiry because they are unable to reconcile the dissonance of
individual rights considerations with the origins and core of personal
jurisdiction. Other Justices elevate the fairness inquiry to the fore, as
they see individual rights protection as critical to the due process
analysis. Reconceptualizing the due process fair location inquiry as
venue acknowledges the validity of both positions. Fairness in location
has little to do with jurisdiction and everything to do with due process
and venue. Recognition of the constitutional aspects of venue brings
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clarity to the Supreme Court’s muddled personal jurisdiction case law.
In addition, constitutional venue would provide a basic measure of due
process in a small but significant category of cases—most notably
detained deportation proceedings—where defendants are prejudiced
when they must defend themselves in gravely unfair locations because
of the firmly established but deeply flawed conception of venue as
lacking constitutional content.
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INTRODUCTION
The most influential voices in the legal profession tell us that, in
civil actions, venue has no constitutional dimension.1 Indeed, it is a
1. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 650–52 (1992) (rejecting
unanimously a defendant’s challenge to a Montana venue statute that permitted venue in any
county of the state in some cases, and holding that “we have no doubt that a State would act
within its constitutional prerogatives if it were to give so much weight to the interest of plaintiffs
as to allow them to sue in the counties of their choice under all circumstances”); 77 AM. JUR. 2D
Venue § 2 (2006) (noting that unlike issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction,
constitutional issues do not implicate venue); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 345 (2008 rev. 9th ed. 2008) (“Unlike personal jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction, the venue of a civil action is a statutory, and not a constitutional, question,
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basic tenet of black letter law taught in every first-year law school civil
procedure class that venue, unlike personal jurisdiction, is a matter of
mere statutory grace. Does this mean then that a resident of Portland,
Maine, could be haled into court 8,000 miles away in Honolulu, Hawaii,
to defend herself from suit no matter the hardship, impediments to a fair
trial, or lack of connections that the defendant possesses with Hawaii?
Surely not. A variety of legal doctrines would prevent this injustice.
Venue statutes, in the first instance, generally require that proceedings
be located where the controversy arose or where the defendant resides.2
Service of process rules generally require that the person be in or near
the location of the proceedings to be served.3 And if these mechanisms
fail, change of venue and forum non conveniens doctrines operate to
remedy the injustice.4 But the venue-protective elements of each of
these doctrines are a matter of grace with no constitutional minimum,
we are told. So what protections remain if these rules were to change to
permit such wildly unfair venues to lie? Since the Supreme Court’s
famous pronouncements in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,5 the
answer has been the due process component of personal jurisdiction, as
embodied in the minimum contacts test.6 The defendant’s lack of
minimum contacts with the state of Hawaii would prevent the state’s
courts from exercising personal jurisdiction.
This constitutional backstop against unfair venues fails, however, in
federal cases where the relevant sovereign is the United States rather
relating primarily to the convenience of the parties and to concerns of judicial economy.”); 14D
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3801 (4th ed. 2013)
(“Though personal jurisdiction implicates constitutional as well as statutory concerns, venue is
wholly a statutory matter.”); 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 110.01[1] (3d ed. 2013) (“[N]o constitutional rights are implicated by the venue statutes.”). On
the other hand, venue in criminal cases does implicate constitutional concerns. See infra note 23.
2. See infra Subsection I.C.2.
3. See infra Subsection I.C.1.
4. See infra Subsection I.C.3.
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. See id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940))). Subsequent cases elaborated on the minimum contacts test and added that courts
should consider “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), whether the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))
(internal quotation marks omitted), as well as urge consideration of concepts, such as purposeful
direction and foreseeability, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 118–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). See also infra Section I.B.
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than the state of Hawaii. The defendant, living in Maine, could hardly
claim a lack of minimum contacts with the forum of the United States.
Personal jurisdiction, in that circumstance, would not provide any venue
protection—venue in Honolulu would, under current conceptions, be
wholly constitutional. It seems absurd that the constitutional guarantee
of due process could permit such an outcome, but because of venue’s
current subconstitutional status, it does.
Sadly, this absurd “hypothetical” is far from hypothetical. In the
normal federal case, we rarely, if ever, confront the constitutional floor
of venue because the subconstitutional mechanisms of venue statutes,
service of process rules, and the due process component of personal
jurisdiction all serve a venue-protective function. In a small but
significant subset of federal cases, however, the venue-protective
function of these subconstitutional mechanisms and the personal
jurisdiction inquiry fail, thus exposing the constitutional floor of venue.
The most prevalent modern example—and a focus of this Article—
occurs in the context of detained deportation cases. Federal immigration
authorities routinely arrest immigrants, including legal residents, and
transfer them to detention facilities in remote locations thousands of
miles away from their homes and families to venues with which they
have no connection whatsoever.7 In fiscal year 2009, the last year with
publicly available comprehensive data, federal immigration authorities
detained over 350,000 immigrants—over half of those detainees were
subject to at least one immigration detention transfer.8 These detainees
are not afforded traditional statutory venue protections.9 Because of the
federal nature of the proceedings, the minimum contacts due process
inquiry also fails to provide any venue protection.10 Thus, hundreds of
thousands of immigrants must litigate their deportation cases in wildly
unfair venues where they lack access to counsel, witnesses, and
evidence necessary for their defense.11 These proceedings demonstrate
the real human toll of the misconception of venue as subconstitutional.
While scholars have not previously explored the immigration
context, there is a small body of scholarship examining federal statutes
that authorize service of process anywhere in the United States and thus
remove the venue-protective function of the service of process rules.12
A scholarly and legal debate has thus emerged regarding whether, in
7. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 &
n.10 (2011).
8. Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE Detainees, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 2, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/220.
9. See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 1302.
10. See infra notes 248–250 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Section II.B.
12. See infra Section II.A.
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such circumstances, the due process personal jurisdiction inquiry can
provide the necessary venue-protective function. Those who argue that
it cannot point out that the forum is the United States and thus the
minimum contacts required by the due process clause for an exercise of
personal jurisdiction must be the defendant’s aggregate minimum
contact with the United States.13 In response, other courts and scholars
focus on the due process requirements of “fairness” and
“reasonableness”—as the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases
articulate—to maintain some personal jurisdiction limit on
impermissibly unfair venues.14
The current debate, however, is largely unsatisfying because,
although both sides persuasively defend their positions, neither
discredits the contrary position. Indeed, both sides are correct. In the
personal jurisdiction inquiry, the relevant inquiry is undoubtedly
whether a defendant has sufficient contact with the sovereign seeking to
assert judicial authority over the defendant. It is equally true, however,
that due process could not permit a trial to occur in a location where a
party faces profound or insurmountable obstacles to a fair trial. This
deadlock, which arises in case law as well as scholarship, occurs
because judges and scholars artificially cabin the debate to the personal
jurisdiction inquiry. By expanding this discussion to explore the
constitutional dimensions of venue, we can move beyond the deadlock
and gain a richer understanding of the due process components of both
personal jurisdiction and venue.15
13. See, e.g., Marilyn J. Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question
Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REV.
285, 297–98; Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L.
REV. 85, 117, 144 (1983); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1124–25 n.6 (1966); Ronald C.
Finke, Recent Decision, Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975),
9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 444 (1976); Brian B. Frasch, Comment, National Contacts as a
Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
686, 697–98 (1982); Elaine T. Ryan, Note, Personal Jurisdiction over Alien Corporations in
Antitrust Actions: Toward a More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 330, 347–52
(1980); see also infra Section II.A.
14. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (3d ed. 2002); Gerald Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the
Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 533–36 (1963); Kevin M. Clermont,
Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
411, 434–37 (1981); Stanley E. Cox, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Aggregation of Contacts: The
Real Minimum Contacts and Federalism Questions Raised by Omni Capital, International v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 42 ARK. L. REV. 211, 292 (1989); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6
(1984); Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967, 972 (1961); see also infra Section II.A.
15. A notable exception to this deadlock is the insightful article by Professor Clermont,
wherein he argues that the reasonableness inquiry in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence overlaps
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Lost in the current debate is an examination of the interrelated but
distinct evolution of the venue and personal jurisdiction doctrines and,
as a result, an appreciation of the way traditional venue concerns have
been shoehorned into the personal jurisdiction doctrine. The due process
minimum contacts inquiry of personal jurisdiction currently serves two
distinct functions: It establishes the outer boundaries of sovereign
authority16 and it protects parties from being haled into court in unfair
and unreasonable locations where they would face significant
impediments to a fair trial.17 The Supreme Court has been explicit about
this dual function.18 The former, sovereignty-rooted function goes to the
very heart of notions of jurisdiction and is a natural extension of the
historic conceptions of personal jurisdiction.19 The latter function,
however, has little to do with traditional concepts of jurisdiction and
everything to do with the core of venue: protecting litigants against
unfair locations for trial. International Shoe’s misconception of this
aspect of the due process inquiry distorts personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence and leaves the current doctrine confused and frequently
maligned.20
with concepts of venue. See Clermont, supra note 14, at 432, 437. Professor Clermont takes aim
at the doctrinal confusion this overlap creates. He argues for a migration away from the
traditional “power” inquiry of personal jurisdiction toward a new broad constitutional inquiry
that focuses on the reasonableness of the forum district or state. Id. at 444–45. Clermont asserts
this inquiry derives from both personal jurisdiction and venue. Id. at 437.
While his approach is notable and indeed critical in the recognition of the constitutional
dimensions of venue, id. at 434, 435 n.116, his prescription that “forum-reasonableness becomes
the sole constitutional test for territorial authority to adjudicate” calls for a wholesale
revamping—indeed scrapping—of a sovereignty-focused concept of jurisdiction, id. at 455, and
any notion of significance in venue, id. at 450. This Article, which identifies cases in which the
consequences of this fairness in venue inquiry can be devastating, proposes a resolution that is
more responsive to such urgent cases while it leaves undisturbed much of our longstanding
doctrines of jurisdiction and venue.
16. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853
(2011) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)).
17. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
18. See, e.g., id. at 291–92.
19. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786–87 (2011) (plurality
opinion).
20. See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 872–75 (2012)
(examining the “decision paralysis” in personal jurisdiction doctrine International Shoe and its
progeny create); Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554 (2012) (noting that “International
Shoe put a variety of topics on the table for assessing the constitutionality of personal
jurisdiction” without prescribing an order in which the myriad topics should be addressed);
Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012) (lamenting the
jurisprudential confusion stemming from personal jurisdiction cases over the past quarter-
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The constitutional floor of venue has remained hidden from view by
the layers of subconstitutional venue-protective doctrines and by the
venue-protective function of the minimum contacts test. However, as
we demonstrate here, there are cases where those mechanisms fail and,
when they do, the failures expose the constitutional floor of venue. This
Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the interrelated origins
of venue and personal jurisdiction, modern case law that incorporates
venue considerations into the due process inquiry of personal
jurisdiction, and subconstitutional venue-protective mechanisms that
obscure venue’s constitutional dimensions. Part II exposes the
constitutional floor of venue by exploring two categories of litigation—
national service of process and detained deportation cases—where
traditional venue-protective mechanisms fail. Part III advances a
constitutional theory of venue and discusses how the theory would both
comport with traditional notions of due process and bring clarity to
modern personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Recognition of the constitutional nature of venue would be a critical
step forward. First, it would both clarify personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence and harmonize the case law with the historic origins of
both doctrines. Second, and more consequentially, it would ensure a
basic measure of due process to the defendants whose cases are
prejudiced when they must defend themselves in gravely unfair
locations because of the flawed conception of venue as lacking
constitutional content.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE: INTERRELATED ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION
A foundational concept of American jurisprudence is the principle
that it is unfair to allow litigants to be haled into far away tribunals
when the litigants and the litigation have little or nothing to do with the
location of such courts.21 Protecting litigants against such injustice is
critical to both venue and personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. However,
despite common concerns, venue and personal jurisdiction occupy
distinct legal spaces and their unique characters protect fairness
century); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a
Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 398–400 (2012) (describing International
Shoe as duplicitous, with one face looking to past personal jurisdiction doctrine, and the other
expressing a new conceptual theory); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2013) (arguing that the Court “has struggled to explain why
state lines should be relevant at all in personal-jurisdiction cases” since International Shoe and
that, post-Nicastro, the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is “even more conceptually
muddled and practically confused than it was before”).
21. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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concerns in specific ways.22 Venue, on one hand, is litigant-protective
because it inquires into the propriety of the site of proceedings based on
the parties’ connections to the place and obstacles to a fair proceeding.23
Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is sovereign-constraining
because it asks whether the sovereign has the authority over the
parties.24 Of course, personal jurisdiction also acts to protect litigants
but, unlike venue, it does not purport to guard against an uneven playing
field between parties. Rather, personal jurisdiction protects litigants
against the unfairness of being subject to the authority of a sovereign
with which they have insufficient connections.25
The sometimes fine distinction between the two and the common
practical effect of both doctrines have resulted in profound confusion
regarding the boundaries between venue and personal jurisdiction.26
22. See 77 AM. JUR. 2D Venue § 2 (2006).
23. See Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651–52 (1992). Venue doctrine
operates differently in criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, venue protections provide
defendants with the constitutional right to be tried in the district where the defendant committed
the crime. The Constitution guarantees this right because it provides that federal criminal
defendants be tried by “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed,” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and that criminal defendants are entitled to trial “in
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The
Supreme Court has agreed that a criminal defendant has a right to trial in the place where the
crime was committed and has found that the Sixth Amendment guarantees this right. See
Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232–33
(1924). Scholars affirm that this accords with the Framers’ intention that the Sixth Amendment
create a right to venue as well as a right to vicinage:
[I]f the debates in the state conventions can be taken as typical, those who
clamored for more specific and more narrowly defined criteria of vicinage were
frequently speaking in terms of venue, or at least they failed to distinguish
clearly between vicinage and venue, between origin of the jury and location of
the trial.
See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
93 (1951).
24. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853
(2011) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)).
25. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
26. See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 203 (1966) (“[A]lthough [the relevant]
provision [of the Jones Act] is framed in jurisdictional terms, the Court has held that it refers
only to venue.”); United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 700, 704–06 (1946) (reversing the
district court’s erroneous determination that venue was improper and that the district court
therefore did not have jurisdiction); Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 82 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007)
(noting that Wright and Miller’s Federal Practuce & Procedure “criticize[s] judicial statements
that ‘venue is wrong’ when referring to an absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
as that ‘blurs the very different concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction,’” while Moore’s
Federal Practice says that “‘the concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction [have become]
essentially coextensive,’ and therefore, venue can be ‘technically proper’ when ‘it complies with
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This confusion is largely responsible both for the erroneous conception
of venue as subconstitutional and for the muddled state of personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence. Accordingly, by examining the interrelated
origins of both doctrines, tracing the modern constitutionalization of
personal jurisdiction, and exploring the way that subconstitutional
venue-protective mechanisms obscure the constitutional floor of venue,
we begin to resolve the confusion.
A. Origin and Early Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction and
Venue Doctrines
The origins of the personal jurisdiction and venue doctrines confirm
the distinct roles played by each. Personal jurisdiction, from the
inception of the concept, constrained the power of the sovereign and in
so doing, protected litigants against unfair treatment at the hands of the
state. Venue, on the other hand, served to make justice accessible to
litigants and to protect litigants against unfair treatment, vis-à-vis an
opposing party who sought to gain a tactical advantage by selecting an
inconvenient location for trial. These early concepts, established in
common law England, were carried forward in the American judicial
system, which emphasized from its foundation the critical virtue in
accessible justice. During the early history of the United States, the
constitutional boundaries of venue, however, went largely unexplored,
first because litigation remained local and largely confined to actions in
state courts, and later, as litigation in federal courts became increasingly
common, because federal service of process rules effectively limited the
range of permissible venues.
Among the key achievements of the English common law system
was the development of judicial mechanisms that allowed civil venue to
be set and cases heard in locations that would avoid hardship to the

the applicable venue statute’ but ‘wrong’ when there is ‘some other procedural obstacle in the
original court, such as a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant’” (quoting 15 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3827 (3d ed. 2007); 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02); Rodriguez v. Bush, 367 F.
Supp. 2d 765, 770 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Although Section 408(b)(3) of [the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act] refers to ‘exclusive jurisdiction,’ the provision is, at
bottom, a directive that the [Southern District of New York] be the exclusive venue for the
federal causes of action to which [the Act] applies.”); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp.,
274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93–95 (D.D.C. 2003) (interpreting the same jurisdictional language from
Rodriguez as not requiring exclusive venue in the Southern District of New York); see also
George Neff Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REV. 307,
310, 316–23 (1951) (finding, in a survey of state venue and jurisdictional statutes, “inaccurate
and misleading” conflations of jurisdiction and venue).
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litigants and enhance the accessibility of the civil justice system.27 In
the early English system, actions against people—rather than actions
based on property28—could be brought in any court so long as the court
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.29 This broad authority to
exercise personal jurisdiction meant that, initially, litigants were
required to travel from the furthest reaches of England to defend
themselves before the court, then centralized in Westminster, which was
both inconvenient and prejudicial to the parties.30
In response to this problem, the concept of civil venue protections
arose.31 Through an act in 1285, Parliament brought civil adjudication
close to litigants’ homes by authorizing justices to conduct hearings of
fact-finding, in cases of general jurisdiction, in the home counties of the
litigants.32 Allowing cases to be heard near litigants’ homes was a
27. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289, 297–302 (1956).
28. E.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.) 1029; 1 Co. Rep. 161, 176
(“[W]here the proceeding is in rem, and where the effect of the judgment cannot be had, if it is
laid in a wrong place.”).
29. See Joseph Henry Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (pt. 2), 26 HARV.
L. REV. 283, 284–85 (1913).
30. See, e.g., Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1029–30, 1 Co. Rep. at 176–77 (requiring the
governor of Minorca, which was part of the British Empire at the time, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 806 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), to defend himself against suit
in London); George Burton Adams, The Origin of the English Courts of Common Law, 30 YALE
L.J. 798, 809 nn.38–39 (1921) (indicating the courts were centralized in Westminster).
31. See Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 191, 199 n.17 (1989) (“Long ago, in England, there were no venue statutes, almost all
actions were ‘local’ in nature, and the plaintiff typically had but one court to choose from. As
courts began to recognize more and more transitory actions, legislatures began to enact statutes
more like the modern venue statutes.”); see also Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663
(C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (“[O]riginally all actions were local. That is, that according to
the principles of the common law, every fact must be tried by a jury of the vicinage. . . . The
jurisdiction of the courts therefore necessarily becomes local with respect to every species of
action.”).
32. Statutes of Westminster, 2d, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *58–60 (explaining that this act authorized justices to travel to sites throughout
the country to conduct factual hearings in local venues closest to the litigants in cases within the
jurisdictional authority of the Westminster court). Centuries later, as the function of the common
law jury became more adjudicative and less testimonial, vicinage requirements were relaxed.
14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3802. Even so, English venue doctrine retained the notion
that the case must be tried in an area related to the dispute; while the rationale for rigid vicinage
in laying “fact-venue” receded, “cause of action venue” became the practice—and finally the
rule—which placed venue at the county specified by the plaintiff when initially pleading the
cause of action. See The Civil Procedure Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 22 (granting the
power to judges to have local actions tried in any county). Although “cause of action venue”
meant, practically, that the plaintiff’s notation on the complaint set the presumptive place of
venue, “cause of action venue” nonetheless retained the notion that avoiding hardship to the
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critical reform, motivated in part by the fact that jurors at that time
decided cases based upon their own knowledge of the facts.33 However,
the reform was probably likewise intended to restrict plaintiffs’ ability
to purposefully bring suit where a defendant would be disadvantaged.34
Trials were held locally, as opposed to centrally at the King’s
Westminster courts, to mitigate “hardship to the parties, witnesses, and
jurors whose attendance was necessary.”35 Moving the site of
adjudication to the counties to allow litigants to establish facts without
hardship to key participants, was considered one of the key
developments during the reign of Edward I, who, in the words of the
father of American common law,36 “perfect[ed]” the English system.37
Accordingly, from its inception, the concept of venue was intended to
protect parties from litigation in locations where they face an unfair
disadvantage.
At that time, the premise behind courts’ jurisdictional authority was
a theory of territoriality and consent to the state’s authority38: since the
English sovereign’s authority extended only as far as its territory and
over its citizens, English courts could assert jurisdiction only over those
either within the sovereign’s territory or citizens of that sovereignty.39
In England, as now in America, a court can assert jurisdiction only over
defendant was key to proper venue placement and therefore change of venue was
“compulsory . . . on a showing of the adverse party.” ALEXANDER MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT
COMMON LAW § 30 (1905) (emphasis added).
33. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 120–21,
123–24, 127–28 (Little Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929); Roger S. Foster, Place of Trial—
Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REV. 41, 43 (1930).
34. Foster, supra note 33, at 43 (explaining that the “plaintiff’s power of determining
venue was abused” and the “successive attempts to restrict [plaintiffs’ venue choice] indicate
that then as now there was temptation to choose the most inconvenient place for the defendant
whether or not it was convenient for the plaintiff”).
35. MARTIN, supra note 32, § 362, at 307; see PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 29.36.
William Searle Holdsworth, Sir William Blackstone, 7 OR. L. REV. 155, 157 (1928) (“If the
Commentaries had not been written when they were written I think it would be very much more
doubtful whether you here [in the United States], and other English speaking countries would
have so universally adopted our [English] common law.”).
36. William Searle Holdsworth, Sir William Blackstone, 7 OR. L. REV. 155, 157 (1928)
(“If the Commentaries had not been written when they were written I think it would be very
much more doubtful whether you here [in the United States], and other English speaking
countries would have so universally adopted our [English] common law.”).
37. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23. Compare Statutes of Westminster,
2nd, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30 (establishing the courts of nisi prius), with 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at
*425 (praising how courts like the courts of nisi prius did justice by resolving disputes in even
the most remote provinces). See generally 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *58–60 (discussing the
courts of nisi prius).
38. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 297–98.
39. Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367–68 (1874).
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a person in a civil suit if that person receives service of process. In the
early period of American law, since the state’s jurisdiction extended
only as far as its territory or over its residents, only those either within
its territory or those who are residents of the state could be served with
process.40 In England, a court could assert jurisdiction so long as the
defendant was served within England’s borders.41 Accordingly, from its
inception, personal jurisdiction was an expression of the boundaries of
sovereign authority over litigants.
The United States’ judicial system was informed by, but not
replicative of, the English system of jurisdiction, venue, and process; it
is necessarily distinct, in part because two sovereign adjudicative
systems function simultaneously within its national boundaries. While it
retained its English forebears’ basic relationship between courts,
litigants, and causes of action, the American judicial system also
reflected a deeper commitment to decentralized and accessible courts
than its monarchical and comparatively centralized common law
ancestor.42 An exploration of the history of these doctrines as part of the
development of the American common law reveals the due process
values that underlie each doctrine, shows how the materialization of this
protection within jurisdictional requirements operated to relieve venue
doctrine of due process constraints, and explains the resultant
characterization of venue as statutory and convenience-focused.
The connection between the geographic locale and the judicial
authority of courts was fundamental to the American judicial system at
its creation. In the pre-Independence era, each colony operated its own
court system and, as a practical matter, functioned as an independent
sovereign.43 When the American colonies won independence, they
united in a federation of American states and authorized the creation of
a federal court system.44 However, despite the creation of a coequal
40. Id.
41. Foster, supra note 33, at 46 n.20 (explaining that a defendant could receive service of
process anywhere within England).
42. Jurisdictional authority was justified as founded upon various theories of sovereign
power, which include consent to the authority of the sovereign and territorial sovereignty, which
generally reflect the political structure of the sovereign. See Beale, supra note 29, at 283–84,
296–301. In feudal Europe, scholars thought a sovereign’s juridical authority derived from
reciprocal rights between rulers and subjects, while in England, where the King’s authority
superseded feudal authority, scholars saw jurisdiction as a matter of territorial principles. See id.
at 283–84. Unsurprisingly, the distinct American political structure, comprised of coordinate
sovereigns, produced an equally distinct approach to personal jurisdiction.
43. See William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American
Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 401 (1968). See generally id. at 398–404 (discussing
the early court systems of many of the American colonies).
44. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (6th ed. 2009) (“Article III, the judiciary article of the Constitution, emerged
from the Convention that met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787.”).
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national sovereignty, American courts continued to operate, as a
practical matter, with little change.45
Contemporaneous accounts of the drafting of Article III, which
authorized the creation of the federal courts, suggest that this may have
been intentional. The Framers remembered the English monarchy’s
control of the national courts, and as such, the protection of fair access
to the courts for those with limited means particularly concerned them.46
At the constitutional conventions, there was considerable debate about
whether the creation of a nationwide judicial system was necessary at
all, and whether such creation could be used to upset the existing system
of locally resolved disputes.47 In these early discussions about the
structure of the federal judiciary, state delegates opposed a federal court
system in which litigation would “carry me a thousand miles from
home—from my family and business—to where, perhaps, it will be
impossible for me to prove [my case].”48 The resultant law thus
reflected the delegates’ common view that there should be numerous
courts arranged such that justice would be brought to every man’s
door.49
Pursuant to Article III’s authority, Congress established a structure
45. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 489–90 (1928) (stating that state courts retain much of their original jurisdictional hold).
46. See, e.g., id. at 489 (noting that opponents of Article III feared the destruction of state
judiciaries); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) (recording the statements of Virginia delegate George Mason).
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb
and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering law as
tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of
the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the
poor.
Id.
47. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 8, 19–20; 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 226 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010) (1971) (describing concerns
about a judicial structure that “offered a tempting means of extending [federal] jurisdiction” and
noting that “[t]he delegates were too familiar with the British constitution not to know that it
was at the level of original jurisdiction that the three central courts at Westminster had each
extended its authority”); Fullerton, supra note 14, at 33 (describing the fear some delegates
expressed to the Constitutional Convention of “the power that would accrue to a system of
federal courts with authority to serve process throughout the country”).
48. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN
1787, at 526 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2d ed. 1996) (1891) (statement of
Virginia delegate George Mason); see also 4 id. at 136 (statement of North Carolina delegate
Judge Samuel Spencer) (discussing the oppression and interference that would be caused by
parties having to travel to distant federal courts).
AND
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for the federal court system through the Judiciary Act of 1789.50 In
response to the Framers’ concerns that plaintiffs could hale people in to
court far from home, this Act created a federal judicial structure that
retained the system of geographically localized courts: federal districts
were established along state lines and those districts were grouped into
circuits, which were granted appellate jurisdiction.51 Thus, district
courts were authorized to hear discrete categories of suits that arose
within their geographical districts.52 Moreover, the Act granted federal
defendants the right to defend themselves in civil actions at the place of
their residence or where they were physically present.53 However, the
50. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 21; cf. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500–01 (1928)
(discussing the difficulties Congress faced in creating the federal judiciary).
51. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73–75; FALLON ET AL., supra
note 44, at 21–22 & n.6 (noting that this Act authorized additional circuit courts to sit in the
remote districts of Kentucky and Maine, as opposed to requiring appellants in those faraway
districts to travel to one of the three main circuits). The rationale for this structure was rooted in
due process concerns:
Members of the founding generation were concerned that a national court
system would subject citizens to suit in distant locales at great inconvenience
and in violation of a perceived entitlement to localized justice. Responding to
this concern, the First Congress, via the Judiciary Act of 1789, limited effective
service to that issued by the district in which the defendant resided or the
district in which the defendant was actually present when served.
A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 325, 326 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in
Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1594 (1992); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond
Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model of Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2897, 2903 & n.17 (2009).
52. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 21–22; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 47, at 462 & n.19;
see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 11–12 (1927).
53. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11(b), 1 Stat. 73, 79 (“[N]o civil suit shall be brought
before either [district or circuit] courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found
at the time of serving the writ . . . .”). This provision, the first relating to venue, remained
essentially unchanged until 1875. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S.
706, 708–09 (1972). Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1, 7–8, 18 Stat. 470, 470, 472–
73 (granting federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over all matters arising under federal law,
subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement), and REV. STAT. § 739 (1878) (codifying
§ 11(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and indicating two session laws before the Act of March 3,
1875 affecting the section), with Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 13, 17 Stat. 196, 198 (allowing
juridiction in rem even if defendants fail to appear), and Act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, §§ 1–2, 11
Stat. 272, 272 (allowing a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants in different districts if they were
all in the same state, and clarifying venue for land that lies across a district boundary within a
state).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/5

14

Markowitz and Nash: Constitutional Venue

2014]

CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE

1167

Act authorized federal courts to hear only a limited category of cases,
and so state courts remained the primary forum for the vast majority of
disputes.54 By and large, disputes were resolved locally, so litigants
were not likely to be haled into courts far away from their homes.55
The basics of American common law actions resembled those in the
English system. In order for a state court to have personal jurisdiction—
authority to exert control over the person—the defendant had to be a
resident of the state,56 physically within the territory of the state,57 or
had to have voluntarily consented to submit to the jurisdiction of the
state.58 In the early years—and indeed the greater part of U.S. history—
the American common law system mirrored that of its English ancestor
54. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 744 (explaining that, in the antebellum period,
which was prior to the grant of “federal question” jurisdiction, parties had to turn to state courts
even for adjudication of federal claims, except in the relatively limited number of diversity
suits).
55. See Foster, supra note 33, at 46–47 (describing state venue rules and finding that“[i]n
almost every state there is some check which would prevent the plaintiff from selecting a remote
county merely to embarrass the defendant” or inconvenience parties or witnesses); id. at 47
n.21, 62 app. (finding that, as of 1930, almost every state set venue presumptively where the
defendant resided or where the cause of action arose and, even in change of venue
determinations, thirty-two of the state venue rules evinced a “tendency to give defendant rather
than plaintiff the advantage of trial at his home”).
56. E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940).
57. Mason v. Connors, 129 F. 831, 833 (C.C.D. Vt. 1904) (holding that service during a
defendant’s physical presence in the state conferred personal jurisdiction); see McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91–92 (1917) (holding state court assertion of personal jurisdiction
improper where service of process upon the defendant, after he had moved out of the state and
was only attempted by publication). The physical presence basis for personal jurisdiction
contemplates a voluntary physical presence; this basis does not apply where a person’s physical
presence is acquired through fraud or coercion. Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213
U.S. 245, 256 (1909) (“It is undoubtedly true that if a person is induced by artifice or fraud to
come within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of procuring service of process, such
fraudulent abuse of the writ will be set aside upon proper showing.” (citing Fitzgerald &
Mallory Constr. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98 (1890))); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313,
314–15 (2d Cir. 1937) (invalidating personal service where the plaintiff lied to the defendant to
induce him to come to the state in order to be personally served); Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F.
700, 703 (2d Cir. 1917) (reversing judgment in a case initiated by “fraudulent service”); Toof v.
Foley, 54 N.W. 59, 60 (Iowa 1893) (holding that the case clearly fell within the rule that “if a
person residing in one jurisdiction be induced, under false pretenses or representations, to come
into another, for the purpose of there getting service upon him, the jurisdiction thus acquired
will be held to have been fraudulently obtained, and the judgment is void”); Comment,
Jurisdiction over Persons Brought into a State by Force or Fraud, 39 YALE L.J. 889, 894–96
(1930).
58. See, e.g., McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91 (“[S]ubmission to the jurisdiction by appearance
may take the place of service upon the person.”). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (providing
for waiver of lack of personal jurisdiction), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”).
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in this respect: service of process could be effectuated only upon a
person within the court’s territorial domain.59 The territorial bounds of
federal district courts generally connected to the states from which they
derived their authority;60 this sphere of control encompasses territory as
well as inhabitants.61 Under this conception of territorial jurisdiction,
residents of a state are subject to its judicial authority and, as such, may
be served with process even when they are beyond its physical
borders.62 Because, as in early England, personal jurisdiction limits
were strict and effectively acted to prohibit unfair venue, there was little
need for litigants to rely on the venue doctrine—and thus few
challenges to venue on constitutional grounds occurred during this early
period.
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, litigable
disputes increasingly crossed state lines, and the federal court system
expanded to respond to changes in social and political needs; as a
consequence, traditional state-based jurisdiction no longer sufficed to
ensure parties a fair forum for justiciable controversies.63 Accordingly,
principles of jurisdiction, venue, and process were modified to protect
due process by ensuring that the defendant, cause of action, and
59. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) (explaining that, for a court to hear a
personal liability action, the defendant “must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of
process within the State, or his voluntary appearance”), abrogated by Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); 1 GOEBEL,
supra note 47, at 226 (explaining that, within each state at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, service of process could be issued only within the state’s borders); see also
Comment, supra note 57, at 894–95.
60. The Judiciary Act of 1789 itself did not provide the specific means by which process
was to be served but, pursuant to the Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94, and the
Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276, federal courts initially utilized the modes of
service employed by the states in which they sat. The Court in Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 300 (1838), interpreted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to prohibit federal service of process
under the Process Acts if it issued beyond the limits of the district in which the federal court sat,
even if the state permitted its courts to issue extraterritorial service in certain cases. Id. at 328.
61. 1 BURR W. JONES & L. HORWITZ, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
CASES § 33, at 185 & n.55 (1913). Initially, district courts were constrained by the territorial
limits of the district in which it sat, but the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
expanded these limits that go to the borders of the states in which the court sits, and provides
that, in general, district courts may invoke jurisdiction based on the rules of the forum state. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
62. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 402–03 (1985).
63. See 5 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Annual Message to Congress, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 41–42 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (warning that “the country generally has
outgrown [its] present judicial system”); RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 12 (2d ed. 1994) (attributing this to
increased commercial activity and post-Reconstruction legislation, among other causes).
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adjudicating sovereign were connected.64 Although the federal court
system has existed almost as long as America itself, it was not until the
late nineteenth century that federal courts became a forum for a
significant amount of litigation.65 After industrialization and the
concomitant social and political developments, the American judicial
system, once a collection of independent common law systems united by
compact,66 required adjustment to accommodate a more unified national
character and cross-country litigation that arose from interstate commerce
and disputes.67 During this period, the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts expanded dramatically through, inter alia, the enactment of
civil rights and removal statutes, expanded habeas jurisdiction, and most
significantly, the creation of federal question jurisdiction.68
64. Cf. WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 63, at 12, 16 (describing the effects of the
expansion in jurisdiction to include federal courts’ new role as “protectors of constitutional and
statutory rights and liberties”).
65. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 744–45 (explaining that federal courts were
“flooded with litigation” after Congress greatly expanded federal jurisdiction in the post-Civil
War era, as it created civil rights causes of action, allowed for removal of state court cases, and
authorized general jurisdiction over suits arising under federal law); see also Frankfurter, supra
note 50, at 501–02 (describing both the legislation by which Congress allocated authority to
federal courts during that time and the political context that prompted this shift). See generally
WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 63, at 6–9 (describing the initial compromises underlying the
Judiciary Act of 1789 that restricted litigation in federal courts and the subsequent expansion of
the federal case load in the mid-1800s).
66. Pre-industrialization, the majority of adjudication—and jurisdiction—was then, as it is
now, found in state courts. FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 744. Estimates have shown that
state courts handle over 98% of filed civil cases. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6 (1986). More recent data on both civil and criminal cases show
that the figure is more than 99%. The National Center for State Courts reported that about 39.4
million combined civil and criminal cases were filed in state courts in 2010. COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT
CASELOADS 3 (2012). In contrast, in 2010, U.S. district courts’ combined filings of civil and
criminal cases reached 361,323 and the combined U.S. courts of appeals reported 55,592 filings
total. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 12 (2011).
67. As argued by Professor Philip Kurland:
The rapid development of transportation and communication in this country
demanded a revision of Johnson’s “eternal principles” incorporated by Field in
the Due Process Clause: “eternal principles” which were appropriate for the age
of the “horse and buggy” or even for the age of the “iron horse” could not serve
the era of the airplane, the radio, and the telephone.
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 573
(1958) (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251, 260 (1958)); see also Friendly, supra note 45, at 510.
68. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Inquiry: Transforming the Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 970 (tracing the expansion of federal jurisdiction and
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As a result of these changes, distinctions between jurisdiction and
venue sharpened and assumed increasing importance. These statutory
changes, along with the significant growth in American business,
greatly increased the numbers of parties before and cases in federal
courts.69 The federal venue provision, however, remained
“undisturbed,” and maintained its defendant-protective requirement that
venue be set either where a defendant resides or where “he shall be
found.”70 Thus, as litigants increasingly utilized the sprawling federal
court system for litigation of all types, statutory venue protections
generally protected defendants from being sued in an inconvenient
forum and therefore constitutional questions about venue did not arise.
Personal jurisdiction and service of process rules also played a key
role in the restriction on the location of trial amid geographically
expansive litigation. It was during this period that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) were first established.71 Those rules carried
forward traditional protections that preserved the notions of proximity
and fairness to defendants:72 under the FRCP, personal jurisdiction was
acquired in the same way as before, through proper service of process

differentiation of the federal court system during this era); FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 28–
29. The Judiciary Act of 1875 established general jurisdiction over all civil cases that arose
under federal law (subject to an amount in controversy requirement), which meant that the lower
federal courts became the site of a significant amount of litigation. Id. at 28; Paul D. Carrington,
Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 738 (1988)
(“[T]he creation of a federal question jurisdiction in 1875 and the sweep of federal substantive
policy created by Congress in the ensuing decades thrust the federal courts into the role of
federal law enforcers . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
69. FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 745; WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 63, at 12,
16; Friendly, supra note 45, at 510. Moreover, “[l]atitudinarian construction of this Act by the
Supreme Court opened still wider the sluices of Federal litigation.” Frankfurter, supra note 50,
at 509 (referring to the Act of March 3, 1875 granting general federal question jurisdiction).
70. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11(b), 1 Stat. 73, 779; Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue
and Service of Process in the Federal Courts—Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608,
609–10 (1954) (noting that “the venue provision was left undisturbed” after Congress revised
the Judiciary Act in 1875); see also Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406
U.S. 706, 709 (1972) (citing In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893)) (noting that while Congress
“greatly expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction” by “substantially revis[ing] the Judiciary
Act” in 1875, the change to the original venue provisions “was stylistic and not substantive”).
71. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)) (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure); FED.
R. CIV. P. hist. n. (noting the original rules became effective September 16, 1938).
72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) (providing defendants with the ground of “improper
venue” as a basis for dismissal); id. 19(a)(3) (authorizing joinder generally but requiring
dismissal of a joined party where the “joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make
venue improper”).
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and an exercise of jurisdiction that comported with due process.73 Thus,
the FRCP authorized a district court to exercise federal jurisdiction over
persons served within the district court’s geographic area and, when
litigants were haled into federal court, they remained entitled to be sued
in a forum near their place of residence or in a place where they
purposefully went.74 In this way, the service of process rules, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, and venue operated together to ensure
that due process protections remained robust within the changing and
geographically expansive judicial system.
As the boundaries of federal personal jurisdiction expanded in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the geographic location of
the trial—a question of venue—became increasingly important.
However, until the 1930s, federal service of process rules constrained
the geographic reach of federal courts75 and made it largely unnecessary
to explore the constitutional boundaries of venue in the federal system.76
However, industrialization and technological advancements easing
transportation and commerce continued to prompt increasing interstate
litigation.77 In response, states began to expand the jurisdictional reach
of their courts through novel jurisdictional long-arm statutes.78 It was
the advent of these statutes that set the stage for the modern
constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction.
73. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1987)
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of ineffective service of process),
superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k); Matthews v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 60 F.R.D. 212, 217 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (finding no jurisdiction over the IRS Director of Utah without service in California
because Rule 4(f) set the territorial limits of the court’s jurisdiction to the boundaries of
California).
74. The Supreme Court explained the relationship between jurisdiction and venue as
follows:
The court had jurisdiction over the parties if the petitioner was properly brought
before the court by the service of process within the southern district. And it
could rightly exercise its jurisdiction, notwithstanding petitioner’s motion,
unless there was want of venue. Venue in the present case is controlled by § 51
of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. [§] 112, which provides, with exceptions not
now material, that “where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the
action is between citizens of different States, suits shall be brought only in the
district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant . . .”
Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 441 (1946) (ellipsis in original).
75. In addition to statutory protections, the doctrine of forum non conveniens protected
defendants during the first half of the twentieth century. See infra Subsection I.C.3.
76. See infra Subsection I.C.1 (describing the venue-protective function of service of
process rules); see also Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 292 (describing development of the
“doctrine of the inconvenient forum” as a defendant-protective measure).
77. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
78. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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B. Modern Constitutionalization of Personal Jurisdiction:
Competing Visions of Due Process
Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, questions
about the permissible reach of state courts over nonresident defendants
arose most frequently where the courts of the defendants’ home states
were called upon to enforce a sister state’s judgment.79 The analyses in
these decisions focused on international comity doctrines, which were
deemed to be an exception to the Constitution’s full faith and credit
requirement.80 However, within a decade of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment,81 the Supreme Court famously declared in
Pennoyer v. Neff82 that “proceedings in a court . . . to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”83 With this
pronouncement, the constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence began.
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century, however, that the
full constitutional boundaries of personal jurisdiction would be tested.
Technological advancements in communication and transportation and
the concomitant rise of interstate commerce increased the volume and
frequency of interstate disputes, and states responded by expanding the
jurisdictional reach of their courts over nonresidents through a wave of
now familiar long-arm statutes.84 From International Shoe through the
Court’s most recent pronouncement in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro,85 the Supreme Court has grappled time and again with the due
process limits on personal jurisdiction. This history has been told and
retold on many occasions,86 and a general recounting herein would not
79. See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175–76 (1851); Boswell’s
Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850); Evans ex rel. Bell v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273,
274–75 (1835); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 449–50 (Pa. 1844); see also Fullerton,
supra note 14, at 8 n.22; Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1123–24 (1981).
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Redish, supra note 79, at 1123–24.
81. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.
82. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
83. Id. at 733.
84. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (plurality opinion); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 202 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958); McGee v. Int’l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
85. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
86. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8–28 (2006); Redish, supra note 79,
at 1115–20.
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significantly advance the discourse. However, one aspect of this
jurisprudence requires special attention: the treatment of traditional
venue interests in the constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction.
Collectively, these cases show the Court struggling with two distinct,
and sometimes competing, notions of the due process interest related to
personal jurisdiction.87 One notion, embodied most significantly in
International Shoe, Shaffer v. Heitner,88 and Insurance Corp. of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,89 is that the central due process
limit on permissible personal jurisdiction is based on notions of fairness
to the defendant—protection against being haled into court in a far-off
forum, which may significantly burden the defendant and ultimately
prejudice the defendant’s ability to mount a defense.90 A second set of
decisions, notably the Court’s decision in Pennoyer, Justice Antonin
Scalia’s opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court,91 and Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, describe the central due
process inquiry as focused not on the rights of the defendants but on the
permissible scope of sovereign authority.92 Other cases, notably WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,93 Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,94 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,95 credit
both due process interests and conduct two distinct due process
inquiries in assessing personal jurisdiction.96 The due process interest
that focuses on the fairness of the forum location to the defendant
connects quite closely with the interests traditional venue doctrines
serve. Accordingly, to understand the constitutional dimensions of
venue, it is critical to tease out the role of this interest in Supreme Court
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
87. Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question
Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1989) (discussing the “two basic and often
conflicting values underlying personal jurisdiction analysis: sovereignty and convenience”);
Clermont, supra note 14, at 413–24 (discussing the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction due
process analysis since Pennoyer).
88. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
89. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
90. See id. at 702–03; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
91. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
92. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783 (2011); Burnham, 495
U.S. at 609–11; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. 310, and Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186.
93. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
94. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
95. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
96. See id. at 108–09; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–77; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 291–92.
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The discourse around these competing notions of due process
emerged in the seminal International Shoe decision. The decision
pertained to an effort by the state of Washington to recover
contributions from a Delaware corporation for Washington’s
unemployment compensation fund. The corporation had several
salesmen who operated in the state and received commissions for sales
there but the corporation did not maintain an office in Washington nor
did it have any contracts for sale or purchase in the state.97 Noting the
move away from the traditional presence requirement for personal
jurisdiction, the Court famously held that “due process requires . . . [that
a defendant outside the forum] have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.’”98 In its announcement of the
“minimum contacts” due process requirement, the Court focused almost
exclusively on the protection of defendants against any
“unreasonable . . . burden” rather than on limitations of the power and
reach of the sovereign forum.99 The Court instructed that the inquiry
should focus on whether the foreign defendants had
such contacts . . . with the state of the forum as make it
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the [defendant] to defend the
particular suit which is brought there. An “estimate of the
inconveniences” which would result to the [defendant]
from a trial away from its “home” or principal place of
business is relevant in this connection.100
The decision of the Supreme Court to tether this due process interest
in a fair location to the personal jurisdiction doctrine was a rather odd
choice. Jurisdiction, at that time and for centuries before, was
understood as a limitation on the power of the sovereign rather than as a
right of the individual against government.101 It is tempting to see the
97. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311–15.
98. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
99. See id. at 317 (“To require the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit
away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due
process.”).
100. Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
101. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. 310, and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 32 (1990); Parrish, supra note 86, at 8–10; A. Benjamin Spencer,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 618 (2006); see also
supra Section I.A.
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distinction as one of just taxonomy—every right inherent in the
Constitution carries with it a corollary limitation on the power of the
government. However, as discussed infra in Part II, the distinction
between viewing the due process interest as a defendant-protective right
or as a limitation on sovereign authority has real consequences. The odd
squeeze of the square-peg rights framework in the round-hole
jurisdiction concept, while a matter of mere taxonomy in most civil
cases, has significant consequences in a select set of circumstances
where jurisdiction is satisfied notwithstanding grave unfairness in the
location of the tribunal.102
In the decades that followed International Shoe’s formulation of the
due process interest in personal jurisdiction, the Court confronted and
acknowledged the sharp break from previous notions of personal
jurisdiction. In Hanson v. Denckla,103 the Court sought to reassert a
traditional conception of jurisdiction. The Court tried to recast the
“minimum contacts” test in terms of those traditional concepts,
asserting that:
restrictions [on personal jurisdiction] are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of the respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the “minimal
contacts” with that State that are a prerequisite to its
exercise of power over him.104
But the language and reasoning of International Shoe was too plain
to ignore and, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court explicitly acknowledged
this evolution of the Court’s concept of the due process interest in
personal jurisdiction and the break with precedent. Justice Thurgood
Marshall, writing for the Court, explained that Pennoyer, wherein the
Court originally found a due process interest in personal jurisdiction,
was concerned with “exceed[ing] the inherent limits of the State’s
power” and thus “the Court focused on the territorial limits of the
States’ judicial powers.”105 But after International Shoe, Justice
Marshall explained, the “central concern” in the due process inquiry
was “notions of fair play and substantial justice” and whether it was
“reasonable” to require a defendant to defend against suit in the forum

102.
103.
104.
105.

See infra Part II.
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 197.
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jurisdiction.106 “Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the
states on which the rules of Pennoyer rest[ed], became the central
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”107
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court attempted to reconcile the two
competing conceptions of due process. The Court laid bare the
dichotomy and credited both conceptions of due process:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to
perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. [First,
i]t protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in
a distant or inconvenient forum. [Second,] it acts to ensure
that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.108
The Court purported to give primacy to the former interest: “[T]he
burden on the defendant [is] always a primary concern.”109 However,
the Court’s analysis focused primarily on the latter interest and on
whether the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State”110 such that the “forum
State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
asserts personal jurisdiction” over the defendant.111
But the instability in the Court’s conception of the due process
interest in personal jurisdiction was on full display as, a mere two years
later in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court all but disavowed the idea
that the Due Process Clause protects traditional notions of limitations on
sovereign power. Justice White, writing for eight Justices, held that
“[t]he personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power

106. Id. at 203 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord id. (“Mr. Chief Justice Stone’s [International Shoe] opinion . . . began its analysis of [the
personal jurisdiction] question by noting that the historical basis of in personam jurisdiction was
a court’s power over the defendant’s person. That power, however, was no longer the central
concern . . . .”).
107. Id. at 204.
108. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980).
109. Id. at 292.
110. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
111. Id. at 297–98. See generally id. at 292–99 (discussing the historical shift in the Court’s
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, and the Court’s continued emphasis—despite this shift—on
the limitations of state power).
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not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”112
An incredulous Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, explained
that “[f]or the first time[, the Court] defines personal jurisdiction solely
by reference to abstract notions of fair play.”113 It is notable how far the
Court had moved at this point from a traditional conception of the
power of the courts defined by jurisdiction toward a conception much
more aligned with the interests at issue in traditional venue doctrine.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland represents the high-water mark in the
Court’s jurisprudence for this conception of the personal jurisdiction
due process interest. But what can explain the apparent sharp break
from World-Wide Volkswagen’s dual vision of the nature of the due
process interest? The question becomes even more puzzling when we
recognize that, in addition to the temporal proximity, Justice White
authored both opinions, and both garnered votes by largely the same
Justices.114 The answer, it appears, can be found in the Court’s emphasis
on the fact that Insurance Corp. of Ireland arose in a federal, not state,
court.115 Justice White explicitly acknowledges the break with
precedent: “It is true that we have stated that the requirement of
personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of
federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-à-vis other states.
For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen . . . .”116 Thus, as applied to
the federal courts, the Supreme Court appeared to view the sole due
112. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(emphasis added). Attempting to reconcile its decision with the decision two years previous in
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court explained:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of
federalism concerns.
Id. at 703 n.10. Thus, the Court cast any due process restriction on sovereign power not as a due
process interest itself but rather as the flip side, a mere byproduct of the individual defendantprotective right.
113. Id. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined Justice White’s opinions
in both cases. While Justice Powell fully joined Justice White’s World-Wide Volkswagen
opinion, he only concurred in the judgment of Insurance Corp. of Ireland. Justice Stewart fully
joined Justice White’s World-Wide Volkwagen opinion, while Justice O’Connor, his successor,
fully joined the Insurance Corp. of Ireland opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
who had dissented from World-Wide Volkswagen, fully joined Justice White’s Insurance Corp.
of Ireland opinion.
115. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 701.
116. Id. at 702 n.10 (emphasis added).
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process interest personal jurisdiction inquiry as focused on venue-type
fairness to the defendant.
In Burger King and Asahi, the Court reasserted the dual due process
inquiry of World-Wide Volkswagen.117 The Asahi decision is notable,
however, for the conversation between the Justices regarding the nature
of the due process interest at issue. The Court, with the exception of
Justice Scalia, unanimously agreed with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
conclusion that the California court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the
Japanese corporate defendant offended “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice,” and thus was unreasonable because of, inter
alia, the great distance it must travel, its unfamiliarity with the legal
system, and the availability of a less burdensome appropriate alternative
forum.118 However, notwithstanding this agreement, the case triggered
two competing decisions—Justice O’Connor’s and Justice William
Brennan’s decisions each garnered four votes in relevant part and
presented dueling conceptions of the due process limits on sovereign
authority.119 As Justice Kennedy later described the two opinions,
Justice Brennan “discarded the central concept of sovereign authority in
favor of fairness and foreseeability” considerations120 while Justice
O’Connor focused on purposeful availment, which required that
“minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”121 This crack
foreshadowed the divergent conceptions of the due process interest in
personal jurisdiction that different factions of the Court would hold and
that would, from Asahi onward through the present, prevent the Court
from delivering a majority opinion that articulates the nature of the
relevant due process interest.122
117. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–73. However, in Burger King—which, like
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, was a federal case, id. at 468—the Court continued to characterize
the restriction on state power as a byproduct of the individual rights that flowed from due
process. See id. at 472 n.13 (“Although this protection operates to restrict state power, it ‘must
be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause’ rather than as a function ‘of federalism concerns.’” (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S.
at 702 n.10)).
118. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
119. Compare id. at 108–13 (O’Connor, J.), with id. at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens was the only one not to join either
position, as he preferred to dispose of the case on other grounds. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
120. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (Kennedy, J.)
(plurality opinion).
121. Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
122. Justice Brennan’s decision provides an example of how the different conceptions of
the due process interest (as an individual right or as a limitation on sovereignty) could, in some
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The crack, which was born in Asahi, grew into a fissure in Burnham.
Again, the Court was unanimous as to the result and held that the
transient jurisdiction rule as applied in this case did not violate due
process. The decision permitted jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding
over the nonresident defendant spouse based upon personal service
upon him during his brief trip to the forum state of California.123 Justice
Scalia, writing for three members of the Court,124 rejected the notion
that any assessment of minimum contacts, reasonableness, fairness, or
inconvenience to the defendant is relevant to the due process analysis
where a defendant, even a transitory defendant, is personally served in
the forum jurisdiction. For Justice Scalia, personal jurisdiction is all
about the limits on a sovereign’s authority.125 In his view, since state
court authority over transitory defendants was firmly established at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,126 there is no need
at all for a minimum contacts analysis in such situations.127
International Shoe, according to Justice Scalia, developed the minimum
contacts test only to define the limits of novel assertions of a state
court’s reach.128 Justice Brennan, in contrast, viewed the due process
inquiry as focused, in all instances, on the notions of “fair play and
substantial justice” announced in International Shoe.129 After Burnham,
it would take two decades before the Court attempted to clarify the
nature of the due process interest in personal jurisdiction.
cases, be more than opposite sides of the same coin, but rather could determine the outcome of
the analysis. As Justice Brennan explained, “This is one of those rare cases in which minimum
requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and substantial justice . . . defeat the
reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum
activities.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
123. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607–08 (1990) (discussing the
facts of the case), with id. at 628 (Scalia, J.) (plurality) (affirming the judgment), id. at 628
(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), id. at 604 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment), and id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. Id. at 606–07. A fourth Justice, Justice White, joined a portion of Justice Scalia’s
opinion, but Justice White did not adhere to the critical portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion that
contained his due process analysis. Id. at 606–07, 619–22.
125. Id. at 609.
126. See id. at 610–16.
127. See id. at 616–19.
128. Id. at 619.
129. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Justice Brennan added that “[i]n Shaffer, we stated that
‘all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and it progeny.’” Id. at 629 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212
(1977)).
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In 2011, the Court once again waded into these waters with two
decisions on personal jurisdiction.130 One of those decisions, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, brought the Court’s focus back to
the nature of the due process personal jurisdiction inquiry. Again, the
Court fractured and failed to issue a majority opinion. Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion, for four members of the Court, is the most
full-throated defense since the birth of the minimum contacts test of the
idea that personal jurisdiction is “a question of authority rather than
fairness.” He asserted that the due process inquiry should focus on
whether the “sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to
judgment,” not on “a rule based on general notions of fairness and
foreseeability, [which] is inconsistent with the premises of lawful
judicial power.”131 Five members of the Court rejected this reasoning,
though they did not agree on an alternative.132 Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent, in response to this aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinion,
explained that “constitutional limits on a state court’s adjudicatory
authority derive from considerations of due process, not state
sovereignty” and that the “modern approach to jurisdiction over
corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe,
gave prime place to reason and fairness.”133
Thus, more than sixty years after the Court began to explore the due
process boundaries of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe, it has
yet to settle on one coherent conception of the issue. One thing that is
clear from the Court’s jurisprudence is that there are two distinct
potential problems that arise when a person is called into court in a
faraway jurisdiction. One is that the forum court may exceed its
authority beyond its sovereign powers. The other is that the defendant
may be at an unfair disadvantage. The former concern pertains to what
we traditionally conceive as jurisdiction, but it fits oddly into the
130. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
131. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789. Justice Kennedy did pay lip service to the idea
that “due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful [judicial] power,”
but concluded that the scope of the individual right is wholly determined by “whether the
sovereign has authority [to render a judicial judgment].” Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy read the
individual fairness protection entirely out of, or, at minimum, entirely subservient to and
encompassed in, the issue of the scope of sovereign power. It is notable that this is the exact
opposite of the Court’s position in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, where it read the limitation on
sovereign power as the byproduct of the individual due process fairness protections. See supra
notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
132. Justice Breyer’s concurrence deems Kennedy’s singular focus on the scope of
sovereign authority as inconsistent with the “constitutional demand . . . of defendant-focused
fairness.” J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. at 2798, 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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individual rights due process framework. The latter, however, fits nicely
into traditional conceptions of due process, but is awkward to conceive
of as jurisdiction. The Court’s discomfort with these two odd fits helps
explain this incoherent line of cases and the inability of the Court to
come to consensus (or even to a controlling holding) regarding the
conception of the legal issues at play.
The “minimum contacts” test exacerbates the conceptual difficulty
because the test is relevant to both inquiries. Whether one has sufficient
“minimum contacts” for a court to deem one to have “purposely
availed” oneself of the forum bears upon whether the individual submits
to the authority of the sovereign and thus comes within the reach of its
court’s jurisdiction. Likewise, whether one has sufficient “minimum
contacts” bears upon whether it is fair, reasonable, and substantially just
for a defendant to expect to face suit and mount an adequate defense in
the location. As discussed infra in Part III, this latter inquiry is more
appropriately described as the due process aspect of venue rather than as
personal jurisdiction. This reconceptualization begins to bring
coherence to the Court’s fractured jurisprudence in this realm.
C. The Role of Subconstitutional Venue-Protective Mechanisms
The Court’s profound error—misplacing the constitutional inquiry
regarding fair location in personal jurisdiction rather than in venue—has
been largely obscured by a variety of subconstitutional mechanisms that
operate, in the large majority of cases, to prevent us from ever reaching
venue’s constitutional floor. Service of process rules and statutory
venue provisions place geographic constraints on the forum of
litigation, and mechanisms like forum non conveniens and the transfer
provision of the Judicial Code allow courts to correct unjust or unfair
venue. To understand why courts have been slow to recognize the
constitutional aspect of venue, it is critical to understand how these
mechanisms operate to obscure the issue.
1. Service of Process Constraints
The federal service of process rules generally operate as a
geographic constraint on where a party can be compelled to defend
itself in court. Although it is well recognized that service of process
rules are merely procedural and do not confer jurisdiction,134 these rules
134. Personal jurisdiction concerns a court’s authority to “proceed to a valid judgment” in a
given case, while service of process “provide[s] a ritual that marks the court’s assertion of
jurisdiction over the lawsuit.” 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1063, at 326, 328. Service
of process rules incorporate an unrelated due process element, which requires that a plaintiff
afford fair notice to a defendant of the commencement of an action. See infra note 265 and
accompanying text.
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are critical because they set forth the means by which a court can assert
jurisdiction over a party.135 Without proper service of process,
jurisdiction cannot be invoked.136
FRCP 4(k) is the default rule for district courts, regardless of
whether they are sitting in diversity or adjudicating federal claims.137 It
provides that, in general, a district court may serve process in
accordance with the rules of the state in which it sits; this means that it
may issue process within the state in which it sits and only against
parties located beyond the forum state’s borders when the state’s longarm jurisdictional rules permit.138 District courts may also serve process
extraterritorially in a narrow category of other circumstances, for
instance when the party to be served is located within 100 miles of the
district courthouse,139 or when another federal statute specifically
authorizes extraterritorial process.140 In this way, these rules serve, as a
practical matter, to ensure that defendants have (or in some cases had)
some contact with the forum of the litigation.
2. Statutory Venue Protection
The entitlement to geographically proximate court proceedings—that
is, the right to defend oneself without prejudicial burden—is most
directly embodied in the provisions set forth in venue statutes. The
135. See, e.g., Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1946) (“[S]ervice of
summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and juridiction of the subject matter of
the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.”), quoted in Omni Capital Int’l,
Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (explaining that “service of process is the means by which a
court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant”); SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 2,164 Watches, More or Less, Bearing a Registered
Trademark of Guess?, Inc., 366 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 2004)); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 1
(2005) (“Any means of acquiring jurisdiction is properly denominated ‘process.’”); see also
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
136. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) (“[J]urisdiction of the district
court over the person of a defendant . . . . must be acquired either by the service of process or by
the defendant’s appearance or participation in the litigation.”); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process §§ 3–4
(2005).
137. See, e.g., Vlasak v. Rapid Collection Sys., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (“Service of process in both diversity and federal question cases [is] provided for
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k).”). For information on the territorial reach of state court
process, see 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process §§ 266–68 (2005).
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see, e.g., Noble Sec., Inc. v. MIZ Eng’g, Ltd., 611 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 525 (E.D. Va. 2009) (noting that the first prong in a district court’s determination
of whether it has personal jurisdiction is “whether personal jurisdiction is authorized by the
forum state’s long-arm statute”).
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B) (the “bulge rule”).
140. Id. 4(k)(1)(C); see also infra Section II.A (discussing the limited number of federal
statutes that authorize service of process nationwide).
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Supreme Court has explained that, unlike jurisdiction, the statutory
venue entitlement is “not a qualification upon the power of the court to
adjudicate, but a limitation designed for the convenience of litigants.”141
The ability to invoke the protection of venue statutes is a “personal
privilege of the defendant,”142 whereas a plaintiff cannot object to venue
since the plaintiff had the initial choice of forum when the plaintiff filed
suit.143 In this way, venue statutes operate as a safeguard against a
plaintiff’s decision to forum shop or to use an inconvenient forum to
prejudice a defendant.
Venue statutes are virtually unanimous in requiring that plaintiffs
bring civil actions in the district where a defendant resides, is present, or
in an area related to the underlying dispute.144 The default venue for
federal question cases is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which allows for
a plaintiff to bring a civil action either where any defendant resides or
where there is a connection to the substance of the claim—that is, where
the property at issue is located or the location where the events or
omissions that gave rise to the claim occurred.145 Some federal statutes
provide separately for venue and, as with the federal general venue
statute, the overwhelming majority locates litigation so as not to
unfairly burden the defendant.146
141. Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953).
142. Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 272 (1922).
143. Olberding, 346 U.S. at 340 (“The plaintiff, by bringing the suit in a district other than
that authorized by the statute, relinquished his right to object to the venue. But . . . the
defendant . . . has a right to invoke the protection which Congress has afforded him.”).
144. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Supp. V 2011); ALA. CODE § 6-3-2 (Westlaw through
the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 395 (West, Westlaw through all 2013–
14 1st Ex. Sess. laws and Res. c. 123); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.011 (West, Westlaw through ch.
272 of the 2013 1st Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1621 (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 2013, No. 277 of the 2013 Reg. Sess., 97th Legis.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83rd
Legis.). The small but significant exception to the Federal Rule is that the general venue statute
does not protect any noncitizen defendant who lacks legal permanent resident status. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (Supp. V. 2011) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be
sued in any judicial district . . . .”). Prior to 2011, even legal permanent residents could not avail
themselves of a venue defense to suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2006) (“An alien may be sued
in any district.”); Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758, 763 (revising the general venue statute to provide a venue defense
to legal permanent residents); see also Mark W. McInerney & Thaddeus E. Morgan, The
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, MICH. B.J., May 2012, at 20,
22, available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article2028.pdf; Jonathan Reich, The
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, FED. LAW., July 2012, at 60,
61.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Supp. V 2011).
146. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 156 (1976) (“The venue provision
of the National Bank Act, § 94, was intended . . . ‘for the convenience of those [banking]
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On the whole, these statutes are relatively consistent in maintaining
the common law protection for defendants who face “inconvenience and
harassment of participating in trial far from home, . . . assuring an
appropriate distribution of cases among different tribunals,” and
reducing “plaintiffs’ control over the litigation they initiate by limiting
the courts to which they have access.”147 Because most venue statutes
require that a suit be filed in a forum with which the defendant has or
has had some connection, they drastically reduce the number of
instances in which a properly venued action will result in substantial
inconvenience to the defendant.
3. Venue Corrective Mechanisms
If, notwithstanding service of process constraints and statutory venue
protections, venue is unjust or unfairly burdensome, it can be remedied
through common law and statutory mechanisms. These correctives—the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and a federal statutory
provision that allows courts to transfer a case to another venue—
provide ways for courts to consider the convenience and the interest of
justice that venue is meant to protect. In doing so, however, these
mechanisms also obscure the constitutional floor of venue.
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine under which courts
can, as a matter of discretion, dismiss a properly venued case when the
chosen forum is unduly inconvenient for the defendant and an alternate
forum exists.148 This doctrine developed in response to the “very old”
problem of “misuse of venue” wherein plaintiffs may adopt a “strategy
of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even
at some inconvenience to himself,” a tactic which “affect[s] the
institutions, and to prevent interruption in their business that might result from their books being
sent to distant counties . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Mercantile Nat’l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 561 n.12 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For examples of
state venue statutes that locate litigation in venues convenient to the defendant, see supra note
144.
147. See Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 167 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
148. The Supreme Court defines the doctrine as follows:
Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, when an alternative forum
has jurisdiction to hear a case, and when trial in the chosen forum would
establish oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant out of all proportion to
plaintiff’s convenience, or when the chosen forum is inappropriate because of
considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems, the
court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case even if
jurisdiction and proper venue are established.
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1994) (alterations omitted) (quoting Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants.”149
Essentially, this doctrine requires a court to determine whether retaining
jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s chosen forum “best serve[s] the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.”150 This doctrine
allows—in fact requires—courts to consider multiple factors that would
affect parties’ ability to litigate the case;151 the goal is to prevent
plaintiffs from choosing inconvenient forums to “vex, harass, or oppress
the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to
[the plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his remedy.”152 While forum non
conveniens originated in state courts,153 it became widely used in
federal courts after the expansion of the reach of personal jurisdictional
in the wake of International Shoe.154
149. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); see also Williams v. Green Bay
& W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1946) (“[Forum non conveniens] was designed as an
‘instrument of justice.’ Maintenance of a suit away from the domicile of the defendant—
whether he be a corporation or an individual—might be vexatious or oppressive. An
adventitious circumstance might land a case in one court when in fairness it should be tried in
another.” (quoting Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 151 (1933) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting))).
150. Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1966); see
also Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507 (recognizing the use of “the convenience of witnesses and
the ends of justice” as factors in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Iragorri v.
United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 70–75 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (discussing the appropriate
“degree of deference” to be “accorded” to the “plaintiff’s choice of forum” and the “assessment
of conveniences”); Wheeler v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 108 F. Supp.
652, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“Since this involves the exercise of the court’s discretion, the court
should necessarily weigh the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial . . . .”).
151. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508.
152. Id. (citing Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The convenience of the
defendant is critical to the analysis, as courts must consider:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
Id.
153. Id. at 505 n.4; see also Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (stating that the
federal Constitution does not bar state courts’ application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens).
154. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 801–02 (1985). As one scholar explains, “[w]hile the absence
of any meaningful venue limitations on a plaintiff’s choice of forum may appear to have been
conducive to forum shopping, thereby creating a need for further limits on choices of forum, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was virtually unheard of, outside of the admiralty context,
prior to 1929. This apparent anomaly can be explained not only by a presumably smaller
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In 1948, Congress codified this analysis by enacting § 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code,155 which, like the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
requires “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.”156 It differs, however, insofar as it allows courts to transfer a
case to another district rather than dismissing it, in an effort “to protect
litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience
and expense.”157 The Supreme Court has construed this difference to
signify that Congress meant to provide greater protection against suit in
an unfair forum, finding that since transfer is a less harsh remedy than
dismissal, defendants can prevail upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience.158
Since § 1404(a) governs in most federal cases as it usually
preempts forum non conveniens,159 protections for defendants who face
suit in inconvenient forums have become more robust.160 Even so,
number of interstate and international transactions, but also by the existence of jurisdictional
limits far more rigid than those that exist today.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Comment,
Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J. 1234, 1234 (1947) (stating that
expansion of personal jurisdiction, via state long-arm statutes, was countered by development of
the forum non conveniens doctrine); cf. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994)
(noting the “murky” origins of the doctrine in Anglo-American law and that forum non
conveniens “within federal courts . . . may have been given its earliest and most frequent
expression in admiralty cases”).
155. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, sec. 1, § 1404(a), 62 Stat. 869, 937
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. V 2011)) (providing for transfer of venue to
any district where the suit “might have been brought” “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses[ and] in the interest of justice”); see also Wilshire Credit Corp. v. Barrett Capital
Mgmt. Corp., 976 F. Supp. 174, 180 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[Section 1404(a)] is a statutory
recognition of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as a facet of venue in the
federal courts.”).
156. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964); see also id. at 616 (explaining that
this provision “reflects an increased desire to have federal civil suits tried in the federal system
at the place called for in the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice”).
157. Cf. Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL–585, 364 U.S. 19, 27 (1960).
158. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (“The harshest result of the
application of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated
by the provision in § 1404(a) for transfer.”). In Norwood, the Court focused on that fact that
Congress made transfer, rather than elimination, the remedy for inconvenient venue, and opined
that “we believe that Congress, by the term ‘for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice,’ intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience” than was required under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id.
159. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996).
160. See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 (noting that a lesser showing of inconvenience will
justify applying § 1404(a)’s transfer remedy); Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363
F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1966) (“The court’s discretion under the common law rule cannot be
equated with its authority to transfer an action to another court of competent jurisdiction under
[28 U.S.C.] § 1404(a) . . . . The court has a broader discretion in the application of the statute
than in the application of the rule.”); Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
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forum non conveniens remains available to protect defendants who face
suit in circumstances that the statutory transfer provision does not
cover.161 Therefore, by operation of these safety-valve mechanisms, the
fair play and justness concerns central to the Court’s due process
analyses are ameliorated in the vast majority of cases without courts
having to reach the constitutional question.
II. EXPOSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR OF VENUE
Given the layers of statutory and common law mechanisms that
work to set venue in a fair location and to transfer venue when the
defendant faces undue burden, it is unsurprising that the constitutional
floor of venue is rarely visible. Yet in a small but significant subset of
federal cases, these venue-protective mechanisms fail to varying
degrees. Examination of such cases—specifically cases that arise under
statutes that provide for national service of process and detained
deportation cases—offers a rare glimpse of the full impact of venue’s
current subconstitutional status.
A. National Service of Process
In a discrete set of circumstances, Congress has supplanted general
venue-protective service of process rules162 with statutes that permit
process to be served anywhere in the United States.163 In cases brought
under such statutes, the service of process rules do not provide any
protection against an unfair location for trial.164 Because these statutes
can “free forum selection in federal question cases from any concern
about a defendant’s contacts with the state in which the federal court

Emps. of Am. v. S. Bus Lines, Inc., 172 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1949) (“Transfer is a less drastic
matter than dismissal, for it involves no loss of time or pleading or costs; and no doubt a broader
discretion may be exercised in ordering it.”).
161. For example, a motion for dismissal under forum non conveniens is available to a
defendant in a case brought in federal court if the case cannot be transferred to another federal
court under § 1404(a) because the more convenient forum is a non-federal forum such as a state
court, or the court of a foreign country. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2
(1994) (stating that forum non conveniens remains available when the alternative forum is
located abroad); TUC Elecs., Inc. v Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35, 37–38 (D. Conn.
1988) (“[E]ven if venue is properly laid in a particular federal district court, where factors of
convenience and justice suggest that the case should proceed in a state or foreign court (i.e., a
non-federal forum), the action may be dismissed under the common-law doctrine of forum non
conveniens.”).
162. See supra Subsection I.C.1.
163. See, e.g., infra notes 169–77 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Fullerton, supra note 14, at 4–6 (discussing national service of process and
personal jurisdiction).
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sits,”165 courts have had to consider anew the extent to which the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits the exercise of a court’s
jurisdiction. In such cases, however, the sovereignty-constraining
component of the due process inquiry is clearly satisfied, at least in the
case of a domestic defendant. But nevertheless, the burden of a distant
location on the defendant can be great. The domestic defendant clearly
has sufficient contact with the sovereign—the United States—but may
be haled from, for example, Vermont to appear before a district court in
Florida without having had the slightest contact with Florida. In this
situation, the circuits are split on what due process requires.166 In light
of the fractured due process jurisprudence since International Shoe and
the competing concerns that may dictate opposite outcomes, it is an
open question whether, when jurisdiction is invoked under a national
service of process statute, the Fifth Amendment requires courts to
consider the fairness of the location to the defendant, rather than just
whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States
such that it does not raise concerns about the nation overreaching its
sovereign authority.167
Congress has authorized nationwide service of process in some
cases, as a “carefully guarded exception[]” to the otherwise localized
service of process rules, to resolve intractable problems that prevent the
federal judiciary from effectively remedying widespread concerns.168
The first statute that allowed for nationwide service of process was
enacted to allow the government to take action in a particular case—an
interstate scandal involving public corruption.169 Since then, Congress
has authorized nationwide service of process in a limited category of
other circumstances where it would otherwise be difficult for a court to
grant complete relief. For example, when Congress enacted antitrust
legislation to combat nationwide business monopolies, Congress
provided for nationwide service of process so that a single district court
could exercise jurisdiction over defendants anywhere in the country if
“the ends of justice require,”170 so that nationwide injunctions could be

165. Casad, supra note 51, at 1598 (making such a remark in reference to a proposal for
federal question national service of process).
166. See infra note 203.
167. Casad, supra note 51, at 1599–600.
168. Cf. Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 623–24 (1925).
169. See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.
170. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 5, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012));
see also Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 15, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 25 (2006)) (similarly providing for jurisdiction if the “ends of justice require” and, in addition,
explicitly authorizing federal courts to assert jurisdiction beyond the borders of the state in
which it sat).
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imposed.171 Likewise, the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917172 resolved
the difficulties that resulted from a single court’s inability to adjudicate
insurance claims because it could not exert jurisdiction over the cases of
multiple claimants against a single fund when some claimants lived
beyond the borders of the forum state.173 That act allowed courts
adjudicating interpleader actions to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over out-of-state claimants.174 Similar concerns motivated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934175 and the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.176
By authorizing service of process nationwide in certain instances,
Congress removed one of the limitations that would ordinarily constrain
the geographical reach of a district court in those cases.177 Recall that
171. See 21 CONG. REC. 2,640–41 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Spooner) (explaining
that, under the then-existing law, a writ of injunction could “only be served and punishment for
its disobedience enforced within the district over which the court has jurisdiction” but, under the
proposed law, it could “be served anywhere within the United States, and if it is disobeyed the
attachment for contempt may be served anywhere within the United States”).
172. Federal Impleader Act of 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929, repealed and replaced by Act of
May 8, 1925, ch. 273, § 4, 44 Stat. 416, 417 (codified in current form at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397, 2361 (2006) (allowing for national service of process to remedy problem in which
insurance companies were faced with multiple claims on a policy in different jurisdictions and
no single court could obtain jurisdiction over all of the parties necessary to fully resolve the
claim).
173. The Federal Interpleader Act was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), which affirmed a California
federal court’s order that an insurance company pay a California claimant even though a
Pennsylvania state court had already ordered the company to pay out the proceeds of the policy
to a Pennsylvania claimant. Id. at 522–23; see H.R. REP. NO. 64-677, at 1–2 (1916); see also
Fullerton, supra note 14 ,at 65–66.
174. H.R. REP. NO. 64-677, at 1–2 (1916).
175. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006)); see Fullerton, supra note 14, at 68–69 (“Although the
legislative history of the securities laws is silent as to the government interests furthered by
nationwide personal jurisdiction, one can easily assume that Congress believed that allowing
investors to litigate securities fraud issues anywhere in the nation was a beneficial approach to
policing the stock market, and an important step in furthering the public interest in a stable
financial community.”).
176. Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391 (2006)); see
also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 534 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 87–1992, at 2–3 (1962) (noting
that the bill is designed to broaden venue provisions to permit acts against government officials
which were, prior to the enactment of the bill, limited to the District of Columbia). Other
statutes providing national service of process include 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012), regarding
confirmation of an arbitration award, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1965 (2006), regarding
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. For additional
federal statutes that permit nationwide service of process, see Fullerton, supra note 14, at 67–70,
and Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106
HARV. L. REV. 387, 436 n.238 (1992).
177. See supra Subsection I.C.1. Although the FRCP authorize the extraterritorial assertion
of jurisdiction in other cases, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (authorizing service of process
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when the first nationwide service of process laws were enacted—and up
through 1938—a district court’s jurisdiction was generally limited to
people found or residing in its territory.178 Thus, a defendant in Vermont
could not generally be forced to appear before a court in Florida unless
the Vermonter either travelled to Florida or moved there. The 1938
adoption of the Federal Rules expanded district courts’ territorial reach
slightly; under the new rules, the Vermonter could be summoned to
appear before a district court in Florida if the plaintiff could serve the
defendant with process under Florida’s long-arm statute because the
federal service rule bootstrapped in the forum state’s service of process
rules.179 Thereafter, in the ordinary federal question case, a Vermont
defendant who did not meet Florida’s long-arm jurisdictional rules
would be protected from suit in Florida. But in cases that involved
federal question claims where Congress had authorized national service
of process, there would be no geographical constraints of Florida
service of process rules;180 accordingly, the Florida district court could
serve process over the Vermont defendant in Vermont—or anywhere in
the United States.
In the abstract, this could have proven disastrous: a tool to prejudice
defendants and a license to forum-shop. It could have meant that a
Kansas resident could hale a Wisconsin-based defendant to district court
in Mississippi,181 and coal operators could drag a District of Columbiabased federal administrator before a district court in Alabama to take
advantage of favorable circuit law.182 However, this parade of horribles
did not occur because, as explained above, a variety of other
mechanisms protect defendants from being forced to defend themselves
in far-flung locales.183 Thus, though the Florida court can assert
through states’ long-arm provisions); id. 4(k)(1)(B) (authorizing service of process within 100
miles of the court), these maintain a geographical tether to the forum state.
178. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text; see also Carrington, supra note 68, at
738 (footnote omitted) (explaining that “[t]he pattern of federal court dependence on state
practice” included “conformity to state law in regard to service of process” and, even with “the
creation of a federal question jurisdiction in 1875 and the sweep of federal substantive policy
created by Congress in the ensuing decades[,] . . . no change was effected in the law governing
the summons”).
179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (authorizing service of process based on a forum state’s
long-arm statute).
180. See id. 4(k)(1)(C) (permitting exercise of personal jurisdiction where service is
“authorized by a federal statute”).
181. Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1081–85 (D. Kan. 1978).
182. A.J. Taft Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1300, 1309 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
183. See, e.g., Waeltz v. Delta Pilots Ret. Plan, 301 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming,
despite proper invocation of jurisdiction through national service of process provision, that the
Atlanta-based defendant was not required to defend itself in the Southern District of Illinois
because venue was improper due to insufficient contact with Illinois); A.J. Taft Coal Co., 291 F.
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jurisdiction over the Vermont defendant, the statutory and doctrinal
protections—including the statutory venue provision, a motion to
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or forum non conveniens—available
to the Vermonter may make it unnecessary to consider whether due
process requires the Vermonter to have minimum contacts with
Florida.184
To be clear, Congress’s power to authorize nationwide service of
process, pursuant to its Article III authority to establish inferior courts,
is not controversial. The contested question is whether, when Congress
exercises such power, the Due Process Clause constrains a court from
action where a domestic defendant would face significant hardship and
disadvantage in the location the plaintiff selects for trial. In the first half
of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court indicated that Congress
could have authorized service of process beyond state or district lines
but it had not, at that time, done so.185 However, after the enactment of
the first nationwide jurisdiction statute,186 the Court faced a direct
challenge to that statute.187 That case, United States v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., involved a suit by the United States against corporations
Supp. 2d at 1313 (transferring the case under § 1404(a) to Maryland); Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at
1081–82, 1101 (dismissing plaintiff’s case after it was transferred to a proper court after
plaintiff brought the case in a favorable forum to avoid a statute of limitations). See generally
supra Section I.C.
184. See, e.g., Waeltz, 301 F.3d at 811; Ret. Plan of the Unite Here Nat’l Ret. Fund v. Vill.
Resorts, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 4249 (RPP), 2009 WL 255860, at *2, *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2009)
(granting the defendant’s motion to transfer venue from New York to Illinois in an ERISA
enforcement action where the statute authorized nationwide service of process, because all of
the parties and documents were in Illinois and the only connection to New York was
convenience for the law firm that represented the plaintiff); Tyson v. Pitney Bowes Long-Term
Disability Plan, No. 07-CV-3105 (DMC), 2007 WL 4365332, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2007)
(granting defendant’s motion to transfer venue from New Jersey to Connecticut despite ERISA
nationwide service of process provision, because of the defendant’s lack of business dealings in
New Jersey and because the claim originated from events in Connecticut only); see also Robert
A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the
Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 34 n.158, 36–39 (1988) (noting that, “even in the absence of
venue provisions,” fairness to the defendant could be restored through transfer of venue or
forum non conveniens); Barrett, supra note 70, at 629–33 (proposing to amend rules to
authorize nationwide service of process in all federal cases but ensure venue protections as well
in order to assure a convenient forum). But see Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A.,
119 F.3d 935, 939 (11th Cir. 1997) (reaching the question of whether due process requires
minimum contacts under national service of process provisions); Fullerton, supra note 14, at
35–38 (arguing that Congress’s power to authorize national service of process should not
withstand constitutional scrutiny because Congress could eliminate the statutory venue
protections at its whim and because of the difficulty of getting reversal of trial courts’
discretionary decisions regarding venue).
185. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
186. See Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509.
187. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1879).
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and others implicated in a scandalous, massive investment fraud
perpetrated by financiers of the transcontinental railroad, which
included U.S. congressmen.188 The Union Pacific Court upheld the
statute’s service of process provision and reasoned that Article III,
section 1 of the Constitution declares that the judicial “power shall be
vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may, from time to time, ordain” so “[t]he discretion, therefore, of
Congress as to the number, the character, the territorial limits of the
courts among which it shall distribute this judicial power, is unrestricted
except as to the Supreme Court.”189 Although the defendants in that
case asserted that the Fifth Amendment prevented Congress from
enacting such a provision, the Supreme Court said only that it was
aware of “no constitutional objection” to Congress’s ability to enact
such a provision and remained silent as to the Fifth Amendment
limitations, if any, on courts seeking to invoke jurisdiction through
nationwide service of process.190
This latter issue—whether the invocation of jurisdiction obtained
under a nationwide service of process provision can violate due
process—remains a contested question. In Union Pacific, the Supreme
Court upheld Congress’s power to authorize personal jurisdiction by
summons service nationwide and found that the relevant geographic
limitation for federal courts was the United States’ borders, but noted
that courts should consider matters of convenience and expense before
they compel parties to answer a summons served nationwide.191 Forty
years later in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board,192 the Court made
clear that nationwide service of process was to be authorized sparingly,
describing it as one of the “few clearly expressed and carefully guarded
exceptions” to the general rule that “a defendant in a civil suit can be
subjected to its jurisdiction in personam only by service within the
district.”193 In so saying, the Court refused to interpret seemingly broad
statutory language in the Transportation Act of 1920 so as to permit the
Railroad Labor Board to compel an individual to come before a court in
188. See id. at 572–78 (describing at length the government’s case against the defendants).
See generally J.B. CRAWFORD, THE CREDIT MOBILIER OF AMERICA (1880), available at
http://archive.org/details/creditmobilierof00craw; ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, THE UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD: A CASE IN PREMATURE ENTERPRISE 17, 53 (1960); HENRY KIRKE WHITE, HISTORY OF
THE UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY 21–23, 73–76 (1895), available at https://archive.org/details/
historyunionpac00whitgoog.
189. Union Pac., 98 U.S. at 602 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
190. See id. at 605.
191. Id. at 604.
192. 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
193. See id. at 622, 624.
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any district in the country.194 Twenty-one years later, following the
FRCP’s expansion of the territorial limits for service of process from
district to state lines, the Supreme Court again stated that “Congress
could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States.”195
In recent years, however, the Court has explicitly reserved opinion on
whether due process constrains the scope of these national service of
process statutes.196
It is perhaps telling that, despite the Court’s sweeping statements
that Article III permits Congress to authorize district courts to serve
process nationwide, Congress has generally declined to do so. In the
few circumstances where it does so, it has done so cautiously, evincing
uncertainty as it expanded district courts’ jurisdiction. At the same time
as it enacted these statutes, largely in the face of events that illuminated
public problems that could not otherwise be addressed, members of
Congress expressed concerns.197 Those concerns were assuaged in part
by the inclusion of venue provisions designed to guard against forcing
defendants to defend themselves in faraway forums and to prevent
forum-shopping.198 Moreover, Congress has repeatedly rejected
proposals to make nationwide service of process the default rule in all
cases that involve federal questions.199
194. Id. at 626–27.
195. Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442–43 (1946).
196. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (plurality
opinion) (explicitly declining to answer “whether Congress could, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien
defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the
defendant and the State in which the federal court sits”); see also Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (declining to consider the constitutional issues
surrounding federal courts exercising personal jurisdiction based on an aggregation of the
defendant’s contacts with nation as a whole), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P.
4(k).
197. See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. 12,150 (1916) (statement of Sen. Atlee Pomerene)
(expressing concern about the “substantial denial of justice” that would result from forcing
insurance beneficiaries affected by the Interpleader Act to travel hundreds of miles to litigate
their claims and arguing that it would nullify any benefit afforded by the legislation); 51 CONG.
REC. 9,414 (1914) (statements of Rep. Clement C. Dickinson) (arguing against provisions that
would allow litigants to file suit in places wholly unrelated to where the cause of action arose).
198. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 74, 86 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012)) (setting venue “in the district wherein the defendant is found or is
an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the sale took place, if the defendant
participated therein”); Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, § 1, 49 Stat. 1096, 1096 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (2006)) (setting venue in interpleader cases where any one of the
claimants resided); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2006) (setting venue for antitrust actions “in the judicial
district whereof [the defendant corporation] is an inhabitant [or] in any district wherein it may
be found or transacts business”).
199. See Casad, supra note 51, at 1597–99.
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In light of the fractured jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction in
recent years,200 it remains unclear whether due process operates to
protect a fair location for trial when nationwide service of process is
authorized. In a federal question case in a federal court, the relevant
sovereign is the United States government; therefore, under the
sovereignty-focused inquiry espoused in Pennoyer, Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Burnham, and Justice Kennedy’s decision in J. McIntyre
Machinery, personal jurisdiction should be satisfied if the defendant has
minimum contacts with the United States.201 However, this ignores the
defendant-focused concerns about fairness and burden that drive the
analyses in International Shoe, Shaffer v. Heitner, and Insurance Corp.
of Ireland.202
This doctrinal ambiguity, coupled with the difficult-to-harmonize
concerns, has resulted in a circuit split. Courts disagree whether, when
national service of process is authorized, a federal court may aggregate
national contacts with the United States to determine if the due process
minimum contacts test is satisfied or whether due process protects
defendants from being haled into an inconvenient location even if that
person has sufficient aggregate contacts with the United States.203 Put
200. See supra Section I.B.
201. See supra Section I.B.
202. See supra Section I.B. This concern was also one of two critical elements in the
personal jurisdiction analyses in World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King, and Asahi. See supra
Section I.B.
203. See Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir.
1997) (“There is considerable debate, however, over the scope of the limits imposed by the Fifth
Amendment when jurisdiction is established over a domestic defendant via a nationwide service
of process provision.”). Compare Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370 n.2 (3d Cir.
2002) (applying a “a fairness analysis consisting of more than an assessment of the defendant’s
national contacts,” based on the Fourteenth Amendment “fair play and substantial justice” test,
though without deciding whether “such an analysis is appropriate in this context”), Peay v.
BellSouth Med. Assist. Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold that in a federal
question case where jurisdiction is invoked based on nationwide service of process, the Fifth
Amendment requires the plaintiff’s choice of forum to be fair and reasonable to the
defendant.”), and Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 947 (holding that the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause requires courts to consider the burden on the defendant, even in the rare
circumstances where a “defendant may have sufficient contacts with the United States as a
whole but still will be unduly burdened by the assertion of jurisdiction in a faraway and
inconvenient forum”), with Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[T]here
can be no question but that the defendant, a resident of the United States, has sufficient contacts
with the United States to support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United
States court.”), Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 & n.25, 157 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting that the
Constitution does not require federal courts to follow state boundaries), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980), and Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the primary question the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
requires, aside from whether service was reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the
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another way, the question becomes whether the defendant must have
sufficient contacts with the state of the forum court or need the
defendant have only minimum contacts with the nation? If the latter,
where do “fair play” and “substantial justice” fit in?204
The majority of the courts apply the “pure national contacts” or
“aggregated contacts” approach, which requires only that the defendant
have “minimum contacts” with the United States as a whole.205 Even
within this camp, there is no unified theory; some describe the
minimum contacts test, in this context, as not “particularly relevant,”206
while others explain that the national contacts test is the fairness test—
they construe fairness to mean being fairly subject to the sovereign’s
authority and conclude that aggregated contacts with various points in
the United States satisfy this test.207
However, at least three circuits have found that International Shoe
requires something more. The Eleventh Circuit, most ardently, has
concluded that the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects individual litigants against the burdens of litigation in an
unduly inconvenient forum and therefore courts must also consider
whether litigation in “a faraway and inconvenient forum” will burden

suit, is whether the defendant has, in the aggregate, minimum contacts with the United States).
See also DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e
are not sure that some geographic limit short of the entire United States might not be
incorporated into the ‘fairness’ component of the fifth amendment.”).
204. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir.
2004) (relying on “aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole”); United States v.
Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “the analytic exercises
are performed with reference to the United States as a whole, rather than with reference to a
particular state”); Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 333 n.4 (“Service beyond the bounds of the
territorial United States obviously raises questions as to the contact of the defendant with the
United States, questions that are absent when a United States citizen is served within the
country.”); Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143 (“[P]lainly, where, as here, the defendants reside within
the territorial boundaries of the United States, the ‘minimal contacts,’ required to justify the
federal government’s exercise of power over them, are present.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958))).
206. Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143.
207. See Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that “sovereignty defines the scope of the due process test”); Fitzsimmons, 589
F.2d at 333 (“Here the sovereign is the United States, and there can be no question but that the
defendant, a resident citizen of the United States, has sufficient contacts with the United States
to support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United States court.”); see
also Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1246 n.13 (7th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to reconsider Fitzsimmons).
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the defendant.208 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a “fairness
test” that considers both the defendant’s contacts with the site of the
forum and the burden to the defendant, in addition to other locationfocused concerns traditionally associated with venue determinations.209
The Third Circuit also treats the due process inquiry as a two-prong test,
asking first whether the defendant has contacts with the United States
and, separately, whether it would comport with fair play and substantial
justice to bring the defendant to the adjudicating forum.210 And, finally,
there appears to be another approach: “a ‘flexible minimum contacts’
analysis that evaluates a defendant’s contacts with the forum, but in a
less demanding fashion than the Fourteenth Amendment requires.”211
In most of the cases thus far, distinct analyses adopted by different
circuits have not produced markedly different results. This is because
the majority of cases in which this question has arisen involve corporate
defendants—domestic and international entities and officers.212 Because
these defendants have fairly obvious resources and the ability to transact
beyond their area of residence, courts have not been persuaded that the
defendants are being unfairly forced to litigate in a far-off forum.213
Given the business-focused nature of many of the statutes that contain
national service of process provisions, this is unsurprising and perhaps
even serves as a rationale for permitting such geographically expansive
service. But in the case of a less resourced defendant, these approaches
will yield markedly different results: for defendants who cannot afford
to travel or pay for witnesses and others to travel to the litigation forum,
a fairness inquiry could mean the difference between a successful
defense and a loss (or forced settlement).214
208. Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 945, 947; see also Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co.,
732 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1984) (“In a case like the present one, where a federal court is
sitting in a federal question case, the purpose of minimum contacts is to protect the defendant
‘against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.’” (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980))).
209. Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assist. Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2000).
210. Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 2002).
211. Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 942 (recognizing this other approach).
212. See, e.g., Peay, 205 F.3d at 1213 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding no showing of unfairness in
requiring corporations based in the southeastern United States to defend themselves in Utah in
light of the companies’ ample resources and “modern methods of communication and
transportation”); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
no demonstration of unfairness in requiring a New Hampshire-based corporate officer and
company—with South Carolinian customers—to defend themselves in South Carolina).
213. See sources cited supra note 212.
214. While some of these defendants could avail themselves of statutory venue provisions
or seek a change of venue, these mechanisms do not guarantee a fair forum, particularly for
nonresident defendants, see supra note 144, and in any case would nonetheless require the
defendant to conduct some litigation in a potentially unfair forum.
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To be sure, even in national service of process cases, this
constitutional question is infrequently reached. As commentators point
out, modern technology and globalization can minimize much of the
burden to a defendant and thereby alleviate the harms of haling her to
court.215 However, subconstitutional protections fail in some
circumstances, most frequently in cases that involve foreign parties, and
it is often the poorest and most vulnerable defendants who experience
harm when they must defend personal or business interests far from
home. In these situations, recognizing the constitutional floor of venue
not only elucidates the doctrinal questions but also ensures protection of
a fundamental principle that underpins our judicial system.
B. Detained Deportation Proceedings
There is, perhaps, no cleaner and more consequential example of the
constitutional floor of venue than the current plight of detained
immigrants facing deportation. Immigrants arrested and detained by
federal immigration authorities are routinely transferred thousands of
miles away from their place of arrest and residence216 to remote
detention facilities in rural areas of the South217 with which they have
no connections whatsoever. Such transfers regularly create
insurmountable barriers to access to counsel and critical evidence
necessary to mount a defense, as well as make it impossible for
immigrants to produce key witnesses.218 Current law and common
practice allow the federal immigration agency, which prosecutes
deportation cases,219 unfettered discretion to venue deportation
proceedings anywhere it desires.220 There are no statutory or regulatory
215. Sterk, supra note 20, at 1204 (stating that “the Court has indicated that modern
transportation and communication systems diminish the importance of personal inconvenience
as a constraint on personal jurisdiction” but noting that “inconvenience is not dead”).
216. Markowitz, supra note 7, at 1302; see also Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE
Detainees, supra note 8.
217. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2009) (providing a heatmap that shows where there is an
excess of detention capacity over demand for detention space).
218. AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 30,
34 (2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf;
see also infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.
219. The agency responsible for the detention of immigrants and prosecution in deportation
proceedings is the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE), a
division of the Department of Homeland Security. Overview, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). Deportation
proceedings, which are technically known as “removal proceedings,” are civil proceedings. See
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
220. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. Human Right Watch found that “ICE
claims an almost unfettered power to transfer detainees at will, resulting in a disorderly system
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limits on venue, regardless of any hardships that a respondent may face
in a distant location.221 Far from venue’s historic origins as a
defendant’s shield against an unfair location for trial, the venue rules in
deportation proceedings are a sword that the prosecuting agency can use
to select the most disadvantageous location possible for the immigrant.
A firsthand account from a 2009 report on immigration transfers by
Human Rights Watch contains an illustrative example of a common
immigration transfer scenario and demonstrates how the venue rules and
practices for detained deportation proceedings present significant
obstacles to a fair hearing:
I lived in upstate New York for 10 years with my four
children and my wife . . . ICE said I was deportable
because of an old marijuana possession conviction where I
never served a day in jail, just paid a fine of $250 . . . They
took me to Varick Street [detention center in New York
City] for a few days and then sent me straight to [detention
in] New Mexico. In New York when I was detained, I was
about to get an attorney through one of the churches, but
that went away once they sent me here to New
Mexico . . . . All my evidence and stuff that I need is right
there in New York. I’ve been trying to get all my case
information from New York . . . writing to ICE to get my
records. But they won’t give me my records, they haven’t
given me nothing. I’m just representing myself with no
evidence to present.222
There are structural factors at play in the immigration detention
context that create obstacles to fair venue for detained immigrants’
deportation proceedings, in particular the glut of relatively inexpensive
immigration detention capacity in remote locations in the South and the
relative dearth of detention capacity near many significant immigration
population centers.223 The numbers show the scope of the problem, with
of detainee musical chairs that often violates non-citizens’ rights.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 19 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1209web
wcover_0.pdf.
221. See infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text. While the governing law and
regulations permit venue to lie in any Immigration Court in any location in the nation for any
respondent, there is a provision in the regulations that permit a respondent to move for a change
of venue. As discussed infra at notes 237–46 and accompanying text, this mechanism is,
however, woefully inadequate to address the grave obstacles to a fair hearing imposed by the
transfer phenomenon.
222. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 1 (alterations in original).
223. SCHRIRO, supra note 217, at 6–9 (2009) (noting “significant . . . shortages [of
detention capacity] . . . in California and the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast states” and indicating
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approximately 430,000 immigrants civilly detained last year for
deportation proceedings,224 and with hundreds of thousands of those
immigrants transferred, as described above, each year.225 The enormous
scope of this problem has attracted significant attention from NGOs,
international bodies, and governmental agencies alike in recent years, as
a number of studies have been published documenting and analyzing
the transfer phenomenon.226
such with heatmaps), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 20 (“ICE maintains the discretion
to detain people wherever there is bed space.”); see also Jennifer Ludden, All Things
Considered: Immigration Transfers Add to System’s Problems (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 11,
2009),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100597565
(interviewing a detainee transferred Pennsylvania to Texas). In recent years, the federal
immigration authorities made modest efforts to increase detention capacity near certain
immigration population centers, see, e.g., Kirk Semple, Plan to Upgrade a New Jersey Jail into
a Model for Immigration Detention Centers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/nyregion/28detain.html, but to date those efforts fall far
short of the action necessary to remedy the vast transfer problem.
224. JOHN SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR.
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011, at 1, 4 (2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement_ar_201
1.pdf (reporting 429,247 total admissions to ICE detention facilities in 2011).
225. In fiscal year 2007, the most recent year for which DHS reported transfer data, the
agency transferred 261,910 detainees from one detention facility to another. U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S
TRACKING AND TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES 2 (2009), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIG_09-41_Mar09.pdf. Data the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse reported
demonstrate that the transfer phenomenon surged in recent years. Huge Increase in Transfers of
ICE Detainees, supra note 8. In 2008, the most recent year with available data, federal
immigration authorities transferred over one-half of ICE detainees and subjected to multiple
transfers approximately one-quarter of ICE detainees. Id.
226. See, e.g., ACLU OF N.J., BEHIND BARS: THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE TREATMENT OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN NEW
JERSEY 11–12 (2007), available at http://www.aclu-nj.org/files/9613/1540/4573/051507Detentio
nReport.pdf; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 7, 29, 34–35, 46; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 220, at 3–5; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS ¶¶ 78–81 (2010), available at
http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/ReportOnImmigrationInTheUnited%20States-DetentionAndDuePro
cess.pdf; RUBEN LOYO & CAROLYN CORRADO, N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGR. RIGHTS
CLINIC, LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: OPENING ACCESS TO FAMILY & COMMUNITY IN THE
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM 1–3 (2010), available at http://afsc.org/sites/
afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/LockedUpFINAL.pdf; NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR.,
HEARTLAND ALLIANCE, ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A FAIR DAY IN COURT 6–9 (2010), available
at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Detention%20Isolation%20
Report%20FULL%20REPORT%202010%2009%2023_0.pdf; LAURA RÓTOLO, ACLU OF
MASS., DETENTION AND DEPORTATION IN THE AGE OF ICE 6–7 (2008), available at
http://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/education/aclu_ice_detention_report.pdf; SCHRIRO, supra
note 217, at 22–24; KAREN TUMLIN ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. ET AL., A BROKEN
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The hardships and injustice that result from immigration transfers
are thus well documented. The obligation to defend themselves far from
their families and homes creates significant obstacles to a detained
immigrant’s ability to mount a defense to deportation. First, transfers
create significant barriers for immigrants who seek legal
representation.227 Since “[eighty] percent of detainees [are] held in
facilities which were severely underserved by legal aid organizations”
and over twenty-five percent are held in a facility with no access to
legal aid organizations of any kind,228 it is no surprise that
approximately eighty-four percent of detained immigrants do not have
legal representation.229 Second, the distance from family and other
support networks, which these transfers create, significantly impedes an
immigrant’s ability to gather and present relevant evidence.230 Third,
and perhaps most disturbingly, federal immigration authorities’
unchecked control over venue allows them to manipulate the controlling
law of a case because the case will be governed by the law of the federal
circuit in the jurisdiction in which the immigration court sits.231 These
SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS
65–66 (2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=9; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., supra note 225, at 6–8; Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE Detainees, supra note 8.
227. E.g., NAT’L IMMIGR. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 226, at 3.
228. Id. A recent study demonstrated that two-thirds of New Yorkers arrested by federal
immigration authorities were transferred to far-off detention facilities and that detained
immigrants who were not transferred were approximately twice as likely to obtain counsel as
those who were transferred. Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study
Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings
(pt. 1), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 364 (2011).
229. NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING
JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 1 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/
files/resources/downloads/LOP_Evaluation_May2008_final.pdf. Not surprisingly, the ability to
obtain counsel has an enormous impact on the outcome of these cases. N.Y. IMMIGRANT
REPRESENTATION STUDY, STUDY GRP. ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A
MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1
(2012), available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_ReportII.pdf
(noting that immigrants with lawyers are approximately 500% more likely to avoid deportation
than immigrants without lawyers); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study
Report, supra note 228, at 383–86.
230. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 3–5, 58–59; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 226, ¶ 398.
231. See, e.g., Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31 (B.I.A. 1989) (noting that the law of the
circuit in which the case “aris[es]” governs immigration cases); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 220, at 36 (noting that transfers “can have the effect of altering the law applied to a
detainee’s case, which is determined by the federal circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction over
the facility where the detainee is housed”). The practical result is that federal immigration
authorities transfer a huge number of immigrants arrested in states in the Second and Ninth
Circuits to detention facilites in southern states where the proceedings are governed by Fifth
Circuit law, which is generally far less favorable to the immigrants. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
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are, of course, precisely the parade of horribles that venue doctrine was
originally designed to protect against.
The operative question for our present inquiry is: how is it possible,
with all the various layers of venue protection embedded in our legal
system, that the law permits such widespread instances of gravely unfair
venues, presenting such significant obstacles to fair adjudications, in
proceedings where such liberty interests are at stake?
Unlike most other civil proceedings, venue statutes offer no
protection in this case. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)232 is
silent as to the proper venue for removal proceedings,233 but the
regulations promulgated under the Act provide that venue is proper
wherever federal immigration authorities choose to file the charging
instrument.234 Accordingly, the first line of venue defense—the venue
rules themselves—impose no limit and give the initiating party, the
government, complete control over the venue of the proceedings.
Nor do service of process rules limit the invocation of jurisdiction in
this case, as they would in most other civil suits. As discussed supra in
Subsection I.C.1, service of process rules often also function to ensure a
fair venue. However, this subconstitutional venue protection likewise
fails in the deportation context. The INA and the regulations provide
that service may be in person or, if personal service is not practicable,
by mail.235 However, unlike the general rule FRCP 4 lays out, the
immigration statute and regulations do not provide any geographic limit
with regard to where federal immigration authorities may effect
service.236
Finally, the change of venue mechanism is rarely a solution in this
situation because it affords far less protection than the general civil
transfer provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The only potential protection
against an unfair venue in deportation proceedings is the ability of the
supra note 220, at 6, 36–37, 37 tbl.11; see also INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 226, ¶ 399 (“[T]he Inter-American Commission observes that the immigration law in each
U.S. federal circuit can vary significantly . . . . [T]he highest rates of immigrant transfers are
into the federal court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas), which
reportedly has very low grant rates of immigration relief.” (footnotes omitted)).
232. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–537 (2012)).
233. See id.
234. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(a) (2012) (“Venue shall lie at the Immigration Court where
jurisdiction vests pursuant to § 1003.14.”); id. § 1003.14(a) (“Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings
before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the
Immigration Court by the Service.”); cf. La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1969)
(“There is no clear mandate in either the statute or regulations as to where a hearing should be
held.”).
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2012) (defining “service”).
236. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
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immigrant to move for a change of venue.237 Unfortunately, the change
of venue mechanism likewise fails to ensure a fair venue.238 The
regulations provide that venue may be changed at the discretion of the
Immigration Judge upon a showing of “good cause.”239
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the immigration courts’
administrative appellate body, has interpreted the “good cause” standard
as requiring a balancing of the factors generally relevant to venue, such
as “administrative convenience, expeditious treatment of the case,
location of witnesses, and cost of transporting witnesses or evidence to
a new location.”240 However, change of venue motions are routinely
237. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b); see also Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th
Cir. 2006) (discussing the regulation for change of venue in removal proceedings). There is also
a recently promulgated administrative policy which purports to “minimize, to the extent
possible, detainee transfers outside [of] the area of responsibility” where they were
apprehended. John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, Policy 11022.1:
Detainee Transfers 1 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionreform/pdf/hd-detainee-transfers.pdf. The new policy acknowledges the hardships of transfers as
it purports to prohibit transfers when the detainee has immediate family members in the area,
when an attorney enters an appearance, when removal proceedings are already pending or
ongoing, or when a hearing is scheduled. Id. at 2–3. Unfortunately, the policy falls far short of
delineating a list of permissible venues necessary to insure a fair hearing and does not take
account of issues such as the ability to obtain counsel, gather and present evidence, and the
prejudice the law of a far-off circuit might present. Moreover, the policy contains a number of
exceptions, which include a rather large exception for when federal immigration authorities
deem the transfer necessary to “relieve or prevent facility overcrowding.” Id. at 3. Insofar as
ICE detention capacity is still not aligned geographically with its enforcement operations, this
exception ensures that the transfer phenomenon will continue to result in the routine deprivation
of fair venues for tens or hundreds of thousands of immigration detainees each year.
238. Ballesteros, 452 F.3d at 1159–60.
239. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b) (2012); see also Ballesteros, 452 F.3d at 1159 (“[Regulation 8
C.F.R. § 1003.20(b)] gives the immigration judge complete discretion, even to the extent that
the immigration judge may still deny the . . . change of venue motion when good cause is
present.”); Kin Sang Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 39 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The decision of whether to
grant a change of venue is committed to the [immigration judge’s] sound discretion and will not
be overturned except for an abuse of that discretion.”). But see Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285,
1289 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Although motions to change venue are left to the sound discretion of the
immigration judge, an arbitrary refusal to change venue can be a violation of the statutory right
to a reasonable opportunity to attend and present evidence at the deportation hearing.”).
240. Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. 480, 482–83 (B.I.A. 1992) (citing Velasquez, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 377 (B.I.A. 1986)). In Rahman, a detained immigrant sought to change venue from
Arizona to Los Angeles because his “counsel of choice, his witnesses, and an interpreter would
be available” there. Id. at 481. The Immigration Court granted the change of venue motion, but
the BIA reversed the immigration judge in part for the judge’s improper focus on the
defendant’s “lack of connections to the place where he was detained.” Id. at 482–83, 485.
Additionally, the BIA held that a detainee did not establish good cause by residence alone and
that “[t]he Government is not required to accommodate the applicant’s choice of a distant
attorney and his acquisition of an interpreter by changing venue at considerable expense.” Id. at
484.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/5

50

Markowitz and Nash: Constitutional Venue

2014]

CONSTITUTIONAL VENUE

1203

denied even if the location of proceedings is distant from the
immigrant’s place of residence;241 deprives the immigrant of access to
counsel242 or evidence;243 is far from the location of witnesses;244 and
changes the governing circuit law in ways prejudicial to the
immigrant.245 The case law demonstrates that “administrative
241. See, e.g., Meng Fei Ye v. Holder, 491 F. App’x 479 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding the
immigration judge’s denial of change of venue motion over the immigrant’s argument that
venue in San Antonio represented a burden because the immigrant lived in New York); Frech v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 1277, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding immigration judge’s
denial of change of venue motion over immigrant’s argument that venue in Miami required
prohibitively expensive travel from his home in Houston); Rivera, 19 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A.
1988) (upholding the immigration judge’s denial of change of venue motion requesting change
from Puerto Rico to New York City because that change would have prejudiced the
government); see also Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 484 (“[W]hile the factors commonly
associated with the applicant’s place of residence may be relevant to the question of proper
venue, the mere fact that an applicant allegedly resides or wishes to reside in another city,
without a showing of other significant factors associated with such residence, is insufficient
cause to outweigh the Service’s opposition to a motion for change of venue . . . .” (citing Rivera,
19 I. & N. Dec. 688)).
242. See, e.g., Mayers v. INS, 70 F.3d 1268, 1268 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
immigration judge’s denial of change of venue motion from Louisiana to New York despite the
fact that immigrant’s attorney was in New York and immigrant subsequently appeared pro se);
Benito Aguayo-Diaz, File: A91 750 478, 2007 WL 4182270 (B.I.A. Oct. 16, 2007) (upholding
the immigration judge’s denial of a change of venue motion because, “while it is unfortunate
that [the immigrant] is detained at a location at some distance from his chosen counsel, that
inconvenience is insufficient, without more, to compel a change of venue”).
243. See, e.g., Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1253,
1255–56 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the immigration judge’s denial of a change of venue motion
because, inter alia, immigrant’s “right to present witnesses and evidence [was not] violated by
the transfer to and hearing in Louisiana” because “[h]e had the same legal right to present
witnesses and evidence in Louisiana that he would have had anywhere, and he has not
demonstrated any practical prejudice to that right resulting from the hearing’s location”).
244. See, e.g., Meng Fei Ye, 491 F. App’x at 479–80 (upholding the immigration judge’s
denial of a change of venue motion over the immigrant’s argument that it would be “more
convenient and cost effective for [him]” for venue not to be in San Antonio because his
witnesses were in New York); Frech, 491 F.3d at 1281–82 (upholding denial of a change of
venue where all witnesses lived in Houston and proceedings were held in Miami); Wenfei Chen,
File: A200 657 453, 2011 WL 585623 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 2011) (upholding denial of change of
venue motion over immigrant’s argument that “potential witnesses reside elsewhere”); Bader,
17 I. & N. Dec. 525, 526 (B.I.A. 1980) (upholding the immigration judge’s denial of a change of
venue motion over the defendant’s argument that a change from Buffalo to Miami would have
allowed him to present expert testimony).
245. See, e.g., Robledo-Amaya v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 167, 170 (5th Cir. 2009)
(upholding denial of a change of venue motion notwithstanding the claim that venue out of
circuit of residence affected controlling law and rendered the petitioner ineligible for relief);
Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); Gosine, File: A075
231 637, 2010 WL 2601543 (B.I.A. June 11, 2010) (upholding denial of a change of venue
motion notwithstanding the claim that venue out of circuit of residence affected controlling law
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convenience”—which usually translates to the cost to the government to
return a detained immigrant to his place of abode and apprehension—
dominates all other factors.246 Moreover, at a very practical level, it is
extremely difficult for detained, sometimes undereducated immigrants,
who have no legal counsel, and often are unfamiliar with the laws and
language of the United States, to adequately prepare and document a
motion to change venue.247
Thus, since the traditional venue-protective mechanisms fail to
operate, all that remain are the due process protections against an unfair
location. But since those due process protections are located in the
personal jurisdiction doctrine,248 it does not provide any protection in
the federal deportation context.249 The United States is the sovereign
that seeks to assert jurisdiction over the immigrant. Therefore, an
immigrant who is arrested at his residence in Seattle, Washington, and
transferred to a detention facility in Florence, Arizona, cannot plausibly
claim she lacks minimum contacts with the relevant sovereign, or that
the federal forum is unreasonable, as she in fact lives in the United

and rendered respondent ineligible for relief); Espinal, File: A38 676 095, 2006 WL 3252544
(B.I.A. Aug. 17, 2006) (same).
246. See, e.g., Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of a
change of venue motion in part because of the cost to the government of transporting the
petitioner); Santos-Sanchez v. INS, 12 F.3d 1098 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of a change
of venue motion because of the cost to the government of transporting the respondent and the
late stage of the proceedings); Rivera, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 690 (affirming denial of a change of
venue motion based in part on the cost to the government of transporting witnesses if the court
changed the venue).
247. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 220, at 61–65 (noting that some detainees,
especially those without representation, will not be able to successfully make a motion for
change of venue).
248. See supra Section I.B.
249. As an initial matter, in our personal jurisdiction inquiry, we have the issue of
presence. That is, at the time when an immigrant held in detention in Texas seeks to challenge
the jurisdiction of the immigration court at the detention facility, she is of course present in
Texas and presence is the traditional touchstone of personal jurisdiction. See McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . .”); supra
Section I.A. But see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 637 n.11 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “there may be cases in which a defendant’s
involuntary or unknowing presence in a State does not support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him”). However, our courts long ago recognized that presence obtained by
force was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. See id. at 613 (plurality opinion) (“Most
States . . . [by the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries] had statutes or common-law rules
that exempted from service of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or
fraud . . . .”); id. at 631 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]lthough, beginning
with the Romans, judicial tribunals for over a millennium permitted jurisdiction to be acquired
by force, by the 19th century . . . this method had largely disappeared.” (citation omitted)).
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States.250 As a result of the failure of all subconstitutional venueprotective mechanisms and because of the misplacement of due process
protections against unfair locations in the personal jurisdiction inquiry,
detained deportation proceedings expose the usually hidden
constitutional floor of venue. By revealing the way venue can be
manipulated without a constitutional safety net, these examples—
national service of process cases and detained deportation
proceedings—demonstrate the need to recognize the constitutional
underpinnings of venue.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF VENUE
Our examination of the interrelated origins of venue and personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence demonstrates the tangled history of these two
doctrines and helps us understand how the core venue interest in a fair
location for trial became miscognized as a part of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry. The rise of interstate commerce, transportation, and
communication technologies prompted states to reach beyond their
borders and expand the jurisdictional limits of their courts through longarm statutes.251 Accordingly, throughout the latter half of the twentieth
century, these changes forced the Supreme Court to define the due
process limits that constrained when plaintiffs could hale defendants
into courts in far-off states.252 In International Shoe, the Court situated
that due process inquiry in personal jurisdiction doctrine.253 It was, on a
theoretical level, an odd choice from the outset because, as the history
demonstrates, fairness in location is the core of venue whereas personal
jurisdiction focuses on the power of the sovereign entity, not the rights
of individuals.254 As a result, over the past quarter century the Court’s
personal jurisdiction cases have been marked by fractured decisions
with dueling opinions that articulate conflicting visions of the nature of
the due process inquiry in personal jurisdiction analysis.255
The theoretical conflict is, in most cases, just that: theoretical.
However, when the federal nature of a case negates the venue-protective
250. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 198 F. App’x 218, 221–23 (3d Cir. 2006)
(rejecting New York resident immigrant’s claim that the Immigration Court in York,
Pennsylvania, lacked personal jurisdiction over him, because he had sufficient minimum
contacts with the United States); Aquilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, 490 F. Supp.
2d 42, 48 (D. Mass.) (“[T]he court [is not] aware of[] any constitutional right to have a removal
hearing held in a specific venue.”), aff’d, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
251. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); McGee v.
Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
252. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
253. See supra Section I.B.
254. See supra Section I.A.
255. See supra Section I.B.
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function of personal jurisdiction and when all of the other
subconstitutional safeguards fail—as is the case in detained deportation
cases—we expose, in the starkest of circumstances, the constitutional
floor of venue.256 Altering the concept of the due process fair location
inquiry as venue, however, reconciles the dissonance of the individual
rights framework with the origins and core of personal jurisdiction and
protects the individual rights element of due process.257 Indeed, this
reframing can bring coherence to the muddled case law because fairness
in location has little to do with jurisdiction and everything to do with
due process and venue.
The Supreme Court has, in various opinions, identified two separate
due process interests it associates with personal jurisdiction, both of
which International Shoe’s minimum contacts requirement purportedly
protects. First, since Pennoyer, the Court recognizes that due process
imposes a limit on the authority of the sovereign to assert personal
256. See supra Part II.
257. Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788–89 (2011)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that “jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority
rather than fairness” and identifying the “principal inquiry” in personal jurisdiction cases as the
question “whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a
sovereign”), Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“To
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, we have
long relied on the principles traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the
territorial limits of each State’s authority.”), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)
(describing due process restrictions on state court assertions of personal jurisdiction as a
“consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States”), with J. McIntyre
Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (insisting that the
constitutional elements of the personal jurisdiction inquiry rest upon “defendant-focused
fairness”), id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he constitutional limits on a state court’s
adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state sovereignty.”),
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629–30 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (focusing the personal
jurisdiction inquiry on fairness to litigants rather than on notions of sovereignty and physical
power), Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982)
(“The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . . must
be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause.”), id. at 713–14 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Whenever the Court’s
notions of fairness are not offended, jurisdiction apparently may be upheld.”), World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (characterizing the
“reasonableness or fairness” of haling litigants into court as the “primary concern” in the
personal jurisdiction due process inquiry), Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)
(describing “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” as the “central
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction,” as opposed to the “mutually exclusive
sovereignty of the States”), and Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[I]n
order to subject a defendant to a judgment . . . if he be not present within . . . the forum, he
[must] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
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jurisdiction.258 This limit on sovereign power is sometimes tied more to
the federalist structure of our system, international law norms, and the
division of power among the states than it is to any individual right
inherent in due process.259 This first due process interest is embodied in
the Court’s amenability-to-suit inquiry, which requires that a nonpresent
defendant purposefully avail herself of the protections or benefits of the
sovereign and thus triggers a reciprocal power of the sovereign to assert
authority over the individual.260 Second, and critically for our purposes,
there is a due process interest in a fair location. As the Court explained,
this inquiry requires an “estimate of the inconveniences which would
result to the [defendant] from a trial away from its home”261 and that the
location cannot be “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that a party
unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”262
This second inquiry is often referred to as the “reasonableness” or
“fairness” requirement263 and requires consideration of such factors as
the hardship on the defendant to litigate in the forum, any obstacles to
the presentation of relevant evidence in the forum, the substantive law
applicable to the dispute, the availability of other more convenient
forums, and any hardship the plaintiff would suffer in those locations.264
When we juxtapose the two due process interests—limited sovereign
power and fairness in location265—with the central tenets of personal
258. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609 (plurality opinion) (“To determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, we have long relied on the
principles traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of each
State’s authority. That criterion was first announced in Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .”).
259. See J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92, 294; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251; Fullerton, supra note 14, at 8–
9; Redish, supra note 79, at 1115–20; see also supra notes 98, 133–34 and accompanying text.
260. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 295; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 423 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“As active participants in interstate
and foreign commerce take advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities offered by the
various States, . . . chief among the obligations that a nonresident corporation should expect to
fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly affected by the corporation’s
commercial activities.”).
261. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
263. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
264. E.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292; Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 100
(1983); see, e.g., Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214–15 (1977);
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957).
265. There is also a third, related due process interest: “Due process requires that the
defendant be given adequate notice of the suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291; see
also Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91 (“The existence of personal jurisdiction . . . depends upon the
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jurisdiction and venue, the parallels are inescapable. As the Supreme
Court explained, venue rules “safeguard against the unfairness and
hardship involved when [a party] is prosecuted in a remote place.”266 As
Charles Wright and Arthur Miller further explained in their seminal
treatise, the purpose of venue rules is “to insure that litigation is lodged
in a convenient forum and to protect [the] defendant against the
possibility that [the] plaintiff will select an arbitrary place in which to
bring suit.”267 In contrast, as Justice Holmes explained, the “foundation
of [personal] jurisdiction is physical power”: the power of the forum to
act against an individual.268 Consider how these concepts compare to
the two due process interests as articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen:
The concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen to
perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.269
The latter function the Court describes is traditionally referred to as
personal jurisdiction, while the former is, with one notable exception,
merely venue refashioned as personal jurisdiction.
The notable exception is that the Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen
and in many of its other personal jurisdiction cases, speaks of the
“burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum”270—not a
distant or inconvenient location. The focus on the forum is a natural
byproduct of the personal jurisdiction framework but, as the examples
in Part II illustrate, that focus is ill-suited in some cases to effectuate the
stated purposes of the inquiry: the prevention of “litigation so gravely
presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought . . . .”). Service of
process requirements secure this due process interest because they have their own “due process
component” which requires “notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” SEC v. Ross,
504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Service of process is distinct from, but
closely related to, personal jurisdiction—service of process being the mechanism by which the
court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See supra note 135.
266. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958).
267. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1063.
268. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
269. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92.
270. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added); accord J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
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difficult and inconvenient that a party unfairly is at a severe
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”271 When the forum is the
United States, a defendant who lives in Portland, Maine, who is sued in
federal district court in the District of Hawaii, in Honolulu, cannot
plausibly claim that the forum of the United States is inappropriate in
any way, even if he never had any contact with Hawaii. But, of course,
depending on the circumstances, the venue of Hawaii—over 8,000
miles away from his home—may indeed be “so gravely difficult and
inconvenient” that he is at a “severe disadvantage” in comparison to his
opponent.
Indeed, the tension that emerges from a focus on the fairness of the
forum rather than the location cannot withstand logical scrutiny.
Imagine a scenario where a Florida resident strikes an Alaska resident
with her car while the Alaskan vacations in Miami. The Alaskan then
returns home and files a lawsuit against the Floridian in Alaska state
court. Imagine further that the Floridian has never been to Alaska nor
had any contacts whatsoever with the forum, is indigent but has pro
bono counsel who will represent her in Florida but not Alaska, and has
no way to pay for the transportation of critical eye witnesses from
Florida to Alaska. If the Alaska court asserted personal jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court would undoubtedly find it unfair and unreasonable to
require the Floridian to defend herself in Alaska, where she would be at
a significant disadvantage, and that to do so would offend due process.
But imagine now that the Alaskan is an employee at the Floridian’s
mom-and-pop grocery store while visiting for the summer in Miami and
that the suit is a Federal Labor Standards Act action for unpaid wages
brought in federal district court in Fairbanks, Alaska. If the analysis
focuses on the fairness of the forum of the United States, the Floridian
defendant could not plausibly contest a suit in the forum of his
residence (the United States) and thus a court would uphold personal
jurisdiction. But it is simply incoherent to hold that the first scenario
offends due process because of the grave obstacles to a fair
adjudication, but that the very same obstacles in the second scenario fail
to raise any due process problems. It is the definition of inconsistency to
hold that the very same obstacles to a fair hearing would be a due
process violation in the state case but not in the federal case, but this is
exactly the result our current jurisprudence dictates. There is, it seems, a

271. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 18 (1972) and McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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flaw in the logic.272 That flaw is the Court’s target of the reasonableness
inquiry toward the forum rather than toward the location.
The Supreme Court never directly grappled with this inconsistency
and, as discussed supra at Section II.A, this logical tension triggered
dramatically divergent approaches from various circuit courts. Some
courts seem untroubled by the asymmetric operation of the due process
requirement in state and federal cases:
[T]he “fairness” standard imposed by [the Supreme Court]
relates to the fairness of the exercise of power by a
particular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the
burdens of litigating in a distant forum. . . . Here the
sovereign is the United States, and there can be no question
but that the defendant, a resident citizen of the United
States, has sufficient contacts with the United States to
support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him
by a United States court.273
Other courts have bristled at the logical inconsistency and strained to
apply due process standards in a universal manner:
We discern no reason why these constitutional notions
272. One could plausibly argue that the distinction lies between the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which operates against states and thus controls in the first scenario, and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which operates against the federal government and thus
controls in the second scenario. But the Supreme Court long ago considered and properly rejected this
distinction. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (relying on Fourteenth Amendment
cases to define limits of the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process protections). Professor
Abraham eloquently noted the logical incoherence when he explained that in the state court context
we protect a defendant against locations “considered so unfair to him as to offend the ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice’ embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Might it not also be unfair to force him to litigate in the federal court across the street?”
Abraham, supra note 14, at 533–34.
273. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Busch v.
Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Given that the
relevant sovereign is the United States, it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant residing within the United
States.”); Haile v. Henderson Nat’l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 825–26 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[N]ationwide
service of process, when authorized by Congress, is not extra-territorial at all. Therefore, the due
process limitation on such process should be precisely the limitations applicable on a state’s
process within its territorial limits . . . .”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Driver v. Helms,
577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978) (“The United States, . . . whose court is here asserting
jurisdiction, does not lose its sovereignty when a state’s border is crossed. The Constitution does
not require the federal districts to follow state boundaries.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974)
(“[P]lainly, where, as here, the defendants reside within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, the ‘minimal contacts,’ required to justify the federal government’s exercise of power
over them, are present.” (footnote omitted)).
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of “fairness” and “reasonableness” . . . should be discarded
completely when jurisdiction is asserted under a federal
statute rather than a state long-arm statute. The language of
the Fifth Amendment is virtually identical to that of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and both amendments were
designed to protect individual liberties from the same types
of government infringement. . . . Although the fact that the
United States is the sovereign asserting its power
undoubtedly must affect the way the constitutional balance
is struck, the assertion of federal power should not cause
courts to abandon completely their role as protectors of
individual liberty and fundamental fairness.274
So then what explains the Court’s odd choice to tether the due
process fairness inquiry to the forum rather than to the location of the
proceedings in the first instance? Part of the answer surely lies in the
fact that International Shoe, and the large majority of the Supreme
Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, arose in the context of state longarm statutes where the issue was whether it was fair and reasonable to
274. Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 1997)
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292); see
also Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assist. Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold
that in a federal question case where jurisdiction is invoked based on nationwide service of
process, the Fifth Amendment requires the plaintiff’s choice of forum to be fair and reasonable
to the defendant.”); Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d
1341, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted) (observing that the “due process clause of the
fifth amendment constrains a federal court’s power to acquire personal jurisdiction via
nationwide service of process” and indicating that the Fifth Amendment inquiry focuses on the
“fairness and reasonableness” of requiring a defendant to litigate in particular forum), rev’d on
other grounds, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Handley v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1272
(6th Cir. 1984) (“In a case like the present one, where a federal court is sitting in a federal
question case, the purpose of minimum contacts is to protect the defendant ‘against the burdens
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292)); Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The only constitutional
limitation on Congressional power to provide a forum is whatever fairness is required by fifth
amendment due process.”); Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding that a defendant in a federal patent action must have minimum contacts with the
state in which the federal court sits for the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction to comport
with due process); Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1, 3–4 (3rd Cir. 1968)
(holding that a defendant in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act action must have minimum
contacts with the state in which the federal court sits for the court’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction to meet the “basic principles of fairness” required by the Due Process Clause); Lone
Star Package Car Co. v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that, when
“cases are governed by federal law, the question of whether they are to be tried in one locality or
another is now to be tested . . . simply by basic principles of fairness”); Oxford First Corp. v.
PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“We reject the notion that there
are no limitations upon extraterritorial service of process under federal statutes such as the
securities acts; the existence of the Fifth Amendment would indicate otherwise.”).
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require a defendant to travel from her home state to the forum state and
defend herself from suit.275 In this way, a “fair forum” was, in these
critical cases, a proxy for a “fair location.” Moreover, the focus on the
fairness of the state, and the apparent lack of initial concern for the
fairness of the location of federal proceedings, makes some sense from
a democratic theory perspective. The due process reasonableness
inquiry does not play the same role in federal and in state cases. The
Court developed the reasonableness inquiry to impose some limits on
states that may overreach in their attempts to assert jurisdiction over
residents of other states276 who lack a political voice in the forum
jurisdiction. In the normal federal case, this is a non-issue. Congress
represents all United States citizens and thus should have the proper
incentives to establish fair venue statutes to prevent plaintiffs from
haling people into court unnecessarily across the country. Thus in the
normal cases, perhaps, there is no need for a constitutional floor to
venue. But, as we demonstrate, in a discrete but significant category of
cases with politically disempowered litigants (such as cases that involve
immigrants or foreign defendants) or where the United States is itself a
party (such as deportation proceedings), the same dynamics necessitate
a constitutional backstop.277 Moreover, there is nothing inconsistent
with the recognition of the constitutional nature of venue and the
simultaneous recognition of the political dynamics that often, but do not
always, prevent us from falling below the constitutional floor.
Another likely factor is the Court’s natural institutional
incrementalism and adherence to stare decisis. Long before the Court
recognized a due process interest in a fair and reasonable location, it
held that there is “nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress
to . . . [authorize] process served anywhere in the United States”
because the location of a federal suit “is merely a matter of legislative
discretion.”278 To find that due process imposes a limit on permissible
venues would have created tension with this entrenched holding. In
contrast, Pennoyer had firmly established a due process limit on
personal jurisdiction.279 In addition, the history of International Shoe
reveals that the litigants never raised a due process claim as a question
275. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789–90; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 696–700 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287; Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 243 (1958); McGee,
355 U.S. at 223; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
276. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part II.
278. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1879).
279. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–36 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310,
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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of venue before the Supreme Court or the courts below.280 Accordingly,
the Courts treatment of the due process fair location inquiry through the
lens of personal jurisdiction was a natural response to the questions
presented and, in the context of the state cases through which the
doctrine developed, sufficient to provide the required venue protection.
Whatever the cause, the decision to locate due process venue
considerations in the personal jurisdiction inquiry is inconsistent with
the history and functions of both doctrines. In the small but significant
class of cases where other location-protective mechanisms fail to
operate, this error can force litigants to proceed in gravely unfair
locations.281
Understanding the due process inquiry in a fair location as venue
would provide a host of benefits. First, it would better comport with the
historic origins of both doctrines. Fairness of location is the historic
280. Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping
and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 781–817
(recounting, at length, the history of International Shoe Co. v. Washington). This is hardly
surprising as International Shoe Co.’s primary claim was that Washington State lacked authority
to levy taxes against it, a foreign corporation, by virtue of the dormant commerce clause. Thus,
the assertion of lack of sovereign authority in the personal jurisdiction argument dovetailed with
the company’s merits position. In contrast, a win on the venue issue would only subject the
company to the same claims in federal district court (with jurisdiction over the claim by virtue
of diversity) in a more convenient location. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315–16.
281. See Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945 (“We discern
no reason why these constitutional notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ should be
discarded completely when jurisdiction is asserted under a federal statute rather than a state
long-arm statute. . . . [T]he assertion of federal power should not cause courts to abandon
completely their role as protectors of individual liberty and fundamental fairness.” (citation
omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292)); Chlomos v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
516 F.2d 310, 314 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1975) (vacating a deportation order upon consideration of,
inter alia, the due process implications of holding a hearing in Florida, far from the petitioner’s
place of residence in New Jersey); La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 n.9 (2d Cir. 1969)
(“Ordinarily the better procedure would be to hold the [deportation] hearing in the district of the
alien’s residence or place of arrest. Obviously it should not be held in a district so far removed
from his residence or place of arrest as to deprive him of a fair hearing.”); Lone Star Package
Car Co. v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (“[When] cases are governed by
federal law, the question of whether they are to be tried in one locality or another is now to be
tested . . . by basic principles of fairness.”); Seren, 15 I. & N. Dec. 590, 591 (B.I.A. 1976)
(“Matters involving procedural due process in a hearing before an immigration judge, are under
his jurisdiction. Venue is, of course, such a matter.”); see also Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S.
909, 910 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court “has established that a
refusal to grant a motion for change of venue may constitute a violation of due process”). But
see, e.g., Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the immigration “changeof-venue regulation does not reflect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or
Federal law”); Aquilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, 490 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (D.
Mass.) (“[T]he court [is not] aware of[] any constitutional right to have a removal hearing held
in a specific venue.”), aff’d, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
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core of venue. While this is closely related in effect, it is doctrinally
distinct from the jurisdictional issues of the fairness of being subjected
to the authority of the sovereign. Second, recognition of the
constitutional dimension of venue would help harmonize the Supreme
Court’s confused personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and allow those
Justices who see fairness in location as unrelated to jurisdiction to find
peace with those Justices who see fairness in location as a central due
process consideration. If they extracted fairness in location from the
personal jurisdiction inquiry and placed it in a venue inquiry, this could
satisfy both camps. Moreover, recognition of the due process floor of
venue will eliminate the logical inconsistency that can now arise where
the very same grave obstacles to a fair hearing can, under current
doctrine, be recognized as a due process violation in state cases but not
in certain federal cases. Finally, and most critically, recognition of the
constitutional boundaries of venue will ensure a most basic measure of
due process for thousands of poor litigants each year who must now
defend themselves in the most consequential of proceedings, thousands
of miles away from their homes, in locations where they have often face
insurmountable obstacles to a fair hearing.282
CONCLUSION
Modern phenomena—advancements in communication technologies,
innovative business relationships, and globalization—continue to facilitate
long-distance interaction and bring us ever closer together, even as we
remain geographically distant. In response, the Supreme Court’s
conception of personal jurisdiction appropriately adapts to the efforts of
courts to exert jurisdiction over far-off defendants. In so doing,
however, the Court conflates the distinct due process interests that
historically underlie limits on personal jurisdictions with those that
underlie venue. The Court’s abandonment of the foundational
understanding of venue and personal jurisdiction muddles Supreme
Court jurisprudence and split circuits. Worse still, when the Court
subsumes the due process interest in a fair location for trial within the
personal jurisdiction inquiry, the Court leaves some defendants with no
protections whatsoever. The time has come to recognize that venue
indeed has a constitutional floor.

282. See supra Section II.A. Delineating the exact substance of the constitutional venue
inquiry is beyond the scope of this project. However, insofar as we argue that the current
“reasonableness” question in the personal jurisdiction context is, in fact, a venue inquiry
miscognized, it is a natural starting point for an analysis of the constitutionality of venue
choices.
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